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ABSTRACT: The last decade has seen the development of a burgeoning literature on the 
relationship between international trade and the protection of human rights, driven in part 
by a series of influential reports produced by the Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights. Some human rights commentators have been heavily critical of the 
trade regime, pointing to a variety of ways in which obligations under international trade 
law purportedly undermine the ability of governments to fulfil their human rights 
obligations. Others see the potential for strong synergies between the two regimes, and 
argue that international trade can be a powerful force for raising global standards of 
human rights protection.  
 
This paper argues that the contemporary trade and human rights literature is seriously 
flawed, in two related ways. First, this literature has developed without any clear and 
explicit thinking about what human rights actors and human rights language bring to 
trade policy debates. As a result, serious engagement between trade and human rights 
scholars has been hampered. To help remedy this defect, the paper offers (and critiques) 
five distinct models for thinking about the function that the human rights movement is 
currently playing in debates about the future of the international trading system. Most 
importantly, it suggests that the human rights movement acts as a ‘trigger’ for policy 
learning in the field of international trade.  
 
Second, the paper argues that accounts of the ‘human rights impact’ of the international 
trade regime are too often one-dimensional and over-simplified. This is because they 
focus solely on the constraints imposed on governments by international trade law. 
Drawing on a variety of institutionalist literatures from political sociology and political 
science, the paper show how the trade regime acts through normative and cognitive 
channels to socialize participants – rather than merely regulate their behaviour – and 
thereby helps to define and constitute their trade policy preferences. Attention to these 
more complicated processes is important because they can be harnessed to help produce 
an international trading order which is yet more conducive to the protection of human 
rights. 
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31. INTRODUCTION 
There is a story, told by a former member of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, of a visit she received some years ago from the “Geneva trade 
representative of a major developed country”. The trade representative had heard that the 
OHCHR was preparing a series of reports on the trade regime: they had come to ask why, 
and expressed “sheer incredulity that a trade agreement was any business of a UN human 
rights institution”.1 The ‘trade and human rights’ debate has clearly come a long way 
since those days, in which it was a struggle even to convince many of any connection 
between the two fields. There is now a relatively widely-held view that the connections 
between international trade and human rights are interesting and in need of investigation. 
The literature on the subject is already large and growing – not only in quantity, but also 
in its range of participants, the scope of its subject matter, and its mainstream appeal. 
Nevertheless, while this literature has without doubt produced much work of great value, 
taken as a whole it is flawed in at least two serious ways. First, it lacks clear and explicit 
thinking about what human rights actors and human rights language contribute to trade 
policy debates – what function they perform, and what distinctive ‘value-added’ they 
bring. As long as thinking about this issue remains unclear and poorly articulated, serious 
engagement between trade and human rights scholars will continue to be hampered, and 
participants on all sides of the debate will in many cases continue to talk past one 
another. Second, the debate has so far proceeded on the basis of an unduly limited, and in 
many ways misleading, map of the ways in which the international trade regime affects 
the effective protection of human rights. Since it is on the basis of this map that critiques 
and reformative proposals are generated, the result has been that the trade and human 
rights debates has so far produced a relatively narrow and constrained transformative 
agenda. In this article, I substantiate these two critiques, and offer some thoughts as to 
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4how those interested in progressing the trade and human rights debate might respond to 
them. 
 
The social history of the trade and human rights debate is yet to be written, and we still 
have no fully satisfactory story about who and what provided its initial impetus, or the 
factors that have shaped its progression since then. For now, however, it is perhaps 
enough to provide a brief impressionistic survey of some of the basic features of the 
literature. Among the most central of those features must be the work of UN human 
rights institutions on the impact of the international trading system on the enjoyment of 
human rights. This began formally around 1999, with the initiation of a broad work 
programme under the rubric of ‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all 
human rights’.2 Among the first fruits of this programme was a report of that name by 
Oloka-Onyango and Udagama dealing, among other matters, with a variety of critiques of 
the World Trade Organization.3 While it is remembered by some as controversial4 - and it 
certainly was critical – to a large extent the authors’ critiques of the trading system 
simply reflected and responded to the strength of contemporary concerns about 
globalization. But perhaps the most sustained and influential contribution has come from 
the High Commissioner’s office, in the form of a series of (so far) six reports. The first, 
released in 2001, addressed the TRIPs agreement and its impact on human health, and 
since then the topics covered have included agricultural liberalization and the right to 
food, the liberalization of trade in services, investment liberalization, and the principles 
of non-discrimination and participation as they apply in the context of trade policy.5
2 See, for example, the resolution of the Commission on Human Rights, ‘Globalization and its impact on 
the full enjoyment of all human rights’, E/CN/4/RES/1999/59, 28 April 1999; and the General Assembly 
resolution of the same name, A/RES/54/165, 17 December 1999. This program, according to Zagel, was in 
turn in part the result of attention directed to the issue at a variety of large UN Conferences in the preceding 
years, such as International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo 1994), World Summit for 
Social Development (Copenhagen 2005) and the Fourth Conference on Women (Beijing 1995), see G. 
Zagel, 'WTO and Human Rights: Examining Linkages and Suggesting Convergences', (2005) 2(2) IDLO 
Voices of Development Jurists, 27. 
3 ‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights’, Preliminary Report, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13, 15 June 2000; Progress report, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10, 2 July 2001; Final Report, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/14, 25 June 2003. 
4 As a result of the phrasing of one sentence in the Preliminary Report, that report has come to be known in 
some circles somewhat disparagingly as the ‘nightmare report’. 
5 ‘The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on human rights’, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, 27 June 2001; ‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights’, 
5While these reports certainly have a critical edge, they have taken a self-consciously and 
consistently moderate line, stressing always that the international trading system can and 
ought to work for the protection and promotion of human rights. They have been read and 
distributed widely, and have been strongly influential in mobilizing and shaping the 
present debate. Other bodies – including treaty-monitoring bodies – have also made 
significant contributions to this broad work programme.6
Of course, this body of work did not arise in a vacuum, and UN human rights institutions 
were not the first to make a connection between human rights and international trade. 
This seems to have been an innovation of some elements of civil society, particularly in 
the context of the campaigns conducted during the negotiation of both NAFTA and the 
aborted Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).7 In some ways, therefore, the UN 
work programme was a response to civil society pressure, or at least to a growing 
perception (arising in part as a consequence of these campaigns) that that international 
trade matters ought to be a central part of modern human rights agenda. But, at the same 
time, the work of UN human rights institutions has been a central driver in expanding and 
directing that civil society agenda. The result is that at present non-governmental 
 
E/CN.4/2002/54, 15 January 2002; ‘Liberalization of trade in services and human rights’, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002; ‘Human rights, trade and investment’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9, 2 July 
2003; ‘An analytical study on the fundamental principle of non-discrimination in the context of 
globalization’, E/CN.4/2004/40, 15 January 2004; ‘Analytical study of the HCHR on the fundamental 
principle of participation and its application in the context of globalization’, E/CN.4/2005/41, 23 December 
2004. See also more recently, OHCHR, Human Rights and World Trade Agreements: Using general 
exceptions clauses to protect human rights, (New York and Geneva: UN, 2005). 
6 For a selection of other trade-related work carried out by a variety of UN bodies, see: the series of reports 
from the Office of the Secretary-General under the common title of ‘Globalization and its impact on the full 
enjoyment of all human rights’, A/55/342 (31 August 2000), A/56/254 (31 July 2001), A/59/320 (1 
September 2004), A/60/301 (24 August 2005); the work of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, in particular its General Comments on the right to adequate food (E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 
1999), the right to education (E/C.12/1999/10, 8 December 1999), the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health (E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000), and the right to water (E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 
2003), as well as various statements made by the Committee, including at WTO Ministerials 
(E/C.12/1999/9, E/C.12/2001/15); and the work of the Sub-Commission’s Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Health, eg, ‘The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health - Mission to the World Trade Organization’, E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1, 1 March 2004. 
7 For some early work on trade and human rights arising from this context, see M. Mehra and International 
NGO Committee on Human Rights in Trade and Investment, Human rights and economic globalisation: 
directions for the WTO (1999); International Institute of Human Rights, Commerce mondial et protection 
des droits de l'homme: les droits de l'homme à l'épreuve de la globalisation des échanges économiques / 
World trade and the protection of human rights: human rights in face of global economic exchanges 
(2001). 
6organizations play a central and expanding role in the trade and human rights debate, and 
have been some of the most important drivers of it. It is hard to single out the work of 
particular NGOs without a large degree of arbitrariness, but the important place of civil 
society in the trade and human rights debate can be seen in a number of different 
developments: the diffusion of human rights language into the work of NGOs primarily 
interested in trade matters; the trend among human rights NGOs to develop new expertise 
and activities on international economic questions, as well as the significant growth in 
groups – and networks – specifically mandated to work at the nexus between the trade 
and human rights regimes, and to facilitate conversation between the two.8
Alongside the work of both UN institutions and civil society has arisen what is by now a 
very large and diverse academic literature, produced by scholars of both the international 
trading system and the human rights regime. A number of events and publications have 
been important in generating a momentum and a sustained interest in the theme. From 
2002 to 2004, the American Society of International Law, in co-operation with a number 
of other institutions9, organised three influential conferences on trade and human rights, 
the proceedings of which have been published relatively recently.10 Earlier, in 2001, a 
lively and high-quality exchange of views between leading scholars in the pages of the 
European Journal of International Law served to excite interest and raise the profile of 
 
8 For those interested in perusing the work of NGOs in this area, the ESCR-Net network (www.escr-
net.org) is a good starting point. Some NGOs active in the field include: 3D (Trade, Human Rights, 
Equitable Economy); Amnesty International, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH); 
Ethical Globalization Initiative (EGI); the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), 
International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN); the Centre for International Trade and Development 
(CECIDE); the People’s Movement for Human Rights Education (PDHRE); Dignity International; 
Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AID); the Lutheran World Federation, and formerly the 
International Centre for Human Rights in Trade and Investment (INCHRITI), among others. Some 
prominent NGOs working closely on trade matters, such as Oxfam, Institute for Agriculture and Trade 
Policy (IATP), Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC), and the Third World Network, have in 
varying degrees also incorporated some aspects of human rights language into their publications. 
9 Georgetown University Law Center, Max Planck-Institute for International Law (Heidelberg) and the 
World Trade Institute (Berne). 
10 T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005); F.M. Abbott, 
C. Breining-Kaufman and T. Cottier (eds.), International Trade and Human Rights: Foundations and 
Conceptual Issues (2006). See also the draft Seventh Report of the International Law Association, 
International Trade Law Committee, http://www.ila-
hq.org/pdf/Trade%20Law/Draft%20Report%202006.pdf.
7the debate.11 More generally, there has been something of an explosion of conferences, 
edited collections and monographs looking at impact of international trade on a wide 
range of human rights, either as a topic in its own right, or as part of larger studies 
looking at economic globalization more generally.12 
An interesting dynamic of this scholarly literature (and indeed of the debate more 
generally) has been its tendency to progressively expand its substantive scope: in many 
ways, it seems as if the literature has proceeded by borrowing critiques of the trading 
system originally developed in other contexts, and rearticulating them in human rights 
language. Early on, discussions on ‘trade and human rights’ tended to concentrate on 
essentially two main topics: human rights conditionality (particularly in respect of trading 
relations between the US and China, Cuba and Burma13); and the labour and employment 
 
11 P. Alston, 'Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to 
Petersmann', (2002) 13(4) European Journal of International Law 815; R. Howse, 'Human Rights in the 
WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann', (2002) 13(3) European Journal of 
International Law 651; E.U. Petersmann, 'Time for a United Nations 'Global Compact' for Integrating 
Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration', (2002) 
13(3) European Journal of International Law 621; E.U. Petersmann, 'Taking Human Dignity, Poverty and 
Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston', (2002) 13(4) European Journal of 
International Law 845. 
12 Among the vast literature, some early examples from a diversity of perspectives include: T. Evans and J. 
Hancock, 'Doing Something Without Doing Anything: International Human Rights Law and the Challenge 
of Globalisation', (1998) 2 International Journal of Human Rights 1; A.H. Qureshi, 'International trade and 
human rights from the perspective of the WTO' in F. Weiss, E.M. Denters and P.J. de Waart (eds.), 
International economic law with a human face (1998), 159; R. McCorquodale and R. Fairbrother, 
'Globalization and Human Rights', (1999) 21(3) Human Rights Quarterly 735; M. Mehra and International 
NGO Committee on Human Rights in Trade and Investment, Human rights and economic globalisation: 
directions for the WTO (1999); A. Tay, 'The New Century, Globalisation and Human Rights', (2000) 8(2) 
Asia Pacific Law Review 139; International Institute of Human Rights, Commerce mondial et protection 
des droits de l'homme: les droits de l'homme à l'épreuve de la globalisation des échanges économiques / 
World trade and the protection of human rights: human rights in face of global economic exchanges 
(2001); A. Brysk, Globalization and human rights (2002); M. Gibney, Globalizing rights (2002); as well as 
the Symposium issue, “The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets” (1999) 25 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law.. 
13 P. Alston, 'International Trade as an Instrument of Positive Human Rights Policy', (1982) 4(2) Human 
Rights Quarterly 155; J.F. Smith, 'NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary Linkage', (1994) 27 UC Davis 
Law Review 793; J.A. Dorn, 'Trade and Human Rights: The Case of China', (1996) 16(1) Cato Journal 77; 
P. Stirling, 'The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A 
Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization', (1996) 11(1) American University Journal of 
International Law and Policy 1; R.W. McGee, 'Trade Embargoes, Sanctions and Blockades - Some 
Overlooked Human Rights Issues', (1998) 32(4) Journal of World Trade 139; C. McCrudden, 'International 
economic law and the pursuit of human rights: a framework for discussion of the legality of 'selective 
purchasing' laws under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement', (1999) 2(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 3; S. Bal, 'International Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights: 
Reinterpreting Article XX of the GATT', (2001) 10(1) Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 62; L. Bartels, 
8impacts of international trade.14 While these subjects retain their place in the 
contemporary literature, the debate has significantly expanded, and they occupy a far less 
central position. An early addition was intellectual property, as human rights language 
was heavily deployed in the ‘TRIPs and public health’ debate.15 More recently, a great 
deal of work in the trade and human rights field centres on questions of development: 
whether and how international trade regimes disadvantages developing countries and 
(certain sections of) their populations. Another recent focus has been on concerns which 
have been raised about the potential constraining impact of international trading system 
 
'Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction The Case of Trade Measures for the 
Protection of Human Rights', (2002) 36(2) Journal of World Trade 353; S.H. Cleveland, 'Human Rights 
Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of Compatibility', (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic 
Law 133. 
14 The question of the effects of trade on employment and working conditions is invariably a part of 
virtually all general commentaries on the relationship between trade and human rights: S. Wright, 'Women 
and the Global Economic Order: A Feminist Perspective', (1995) 10(2) American University Journal of 
International Law and Policy 861; L.A. Compa and S.F. Diamond, Human rights, labor rights, and 
international trade (1996); R. Howse, 'The World Trade Organization and the protection of workers' 
rights', (1999) 3(1) Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 131; A. Taylor and C. Thomas, Global 
trade and global social issues (1999); R. Howse and M. Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global 
Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organisation, International Centre for Human Rights and 
Democratic Development (2000); A.E.-S. Tay, 'The New Century, Globalisation and Human Rights', 
(2000) 8(2) Asia Pacific Law Review 139; M. Cohn, 'The World Trade Organization: Elevating Property 
Interests above Human Rights', (2001) 29(3) Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 427; 
H. Lim, 'Trade and Human Rights - What's at Issue?' (2001) 35(2) Journal of World Trade 275; A. Brysk, 
Globalization and human rights (2002); D. Shelton, 'Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World', 
(2002) 25(2) Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 273; R. Wai, 'Countering, 
Branding, Dealing: Using Economic and Social Rights in and around the International Trade Regime', 
(2003) 14(1) European Journal of International Law 35 There are those, it should be noted, who do not 
think that labour rights issues are properly part of a human rights agenda. 
15 See OHCHR, ‘The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on 
human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, 27 June 2001; the report of the Sub-Commission’s Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Health, eg, ‘The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health - Mission to the World Trade Organization’, 
E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1, 1 March 2004; A.R. Chapman, 'The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual 
Property Protection', (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic Law 861; C. Dommen, 'Raising Human 
Rights Concerns in the World Trade Organization: Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies', (2002) 24(1) 
Human Rights Quarterly 1; E.M. Fox, 'Globalization and Human Rights: Looking out for the Welfare of 
the Worst Off', (2002) 35(1) New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 201; R. Wai, 
'Countering, Branding, Dealing: Using Economic and Social Rights in and around the International Trade 
Regime', (2003) 14(1) European Journal of International Law 35; L.R. Helfer, 'Mediating Interactions in 
an Expanding International Intellectual Property Regime', (2004) 36 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 123; L.R. Helfer, 'Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking', (2004) 29(1) Yale Journal of International Law 1; F. 
Abbott, 'The 'Rule of Reason' and the Right to Health: Integrating Human Rights and Competition 
Principles in the context of TRIPS' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and 
International Trade (2005), 279; J. Crook, 'Balancing Intellectual Property Protection with the Human 
Right to Health', (2005) 23 Berkeley Journal of International Law 524; F. Abbott, 'TRIPS and Human 
Rights: Preliminary Reflections' in F.M. Abbott, C. Breining-Kaufman and T. Cottier (eds.), International 
Trade and Human Rights: Foundations and Conceptual Issues (2006), 145. 
9on what has been termed ‘social regulation’ – that is, health and safety regulation, 
consumer protection regimes, equal opportunity legislation, labour market regulation, 
among others, all of which are seen as tools for the protection of human rights.16 From 
around 2000 or 2001, the debate has also encompassed questions concerning the impact 
of services liberalization on the provision of essential services to the poor.17 
How, then, does this article fit into that literature? As already stated in the opening 
paragraph, I bring to bear two core critiques of the trade and human rights debate as a 
whole, which correspond to Parts 2 and 3 of this article. In Part 2, I look at what has been 
said about the impact of the trade regime on the enjoyment of human rights. In most of 
this literature, the trade regime is understood as primarily a system of formal rules and 
associated enforcement machinery. For most commentators, we know the ‘human rights 
impact’ of the trade regime by analysing how these formal legal obligations constrain 
governments’ ability to take measures to protect human rights. Inevitably, this analysis 
has produced a narrow reformative agenda – one which concentrates on formal 
amendment to WTO rules (and rule-making processes), and which moreover focusses 
largely on relaxing the obligations imposed by them, creating greater ‘policy space’ for 
WTO Members. In my view, formal analysis of WTO rules yields a highly incomplete 
 
16 Discussions of these and other regulatory issues can be found in: A. Orford, 'Contesting Globalization: A 
Feminist Perspective on the Future of Human Rights', (1998) 8(2) Transnational Law and Contemporary 
Problems 171; S. Charnovitz, 'The Global Market as Friend or Foe of Human Rights', (1999) 25(1) 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 113; R. Howse and M. Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global 
Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organisation, International Centre for Human Rights and 
Democratic Development (2000); J.T. Gathii, 'Re-Characterizing the Social in the Constitutionalization of 
the WTO: A Preliminary Analysis', (2001) 7 Widener Law Symposium Journal 137; T. Cottier, 'Trade and 
Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover', (2002) 5(1) Journal of International Economic Law 111; C. 
Dommen, 'Raising Human Rights Concerns in the World Trade Organization: Actors, Processes and 
Possible Strategies', (2002) 24(1) Human Rights Quarterly 1; G. Marceau, 'WTO Dispute Settlement and 
Human Rights', (2002) 13(4) European Journal of International Law 753, as well as OHCHR, ‘An 
analytical study on the fundamental principle of non-discrimination in the context of globalization’, 
E/CN.4/2004/40, 15 January 2004. 
17 OHCHR, ‘Liberalization of trade in services and human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002; 
CIEL, Going with the Flow: How International Trade, Finance and Investment Regimes Affect the 
Provision of Water to the Poor, Center for International Environmental Law (2003); CIEL, Water Traded: 
A Center for International Environmental Law Issue Brief, Center for International Environmental Law 
(2003); CIEL, GATS and Water: Retaining Policy Space to Serve the Poor, Center for International 
Environmental Law (2003); A. Ostrovksy, R. Speed and E. Tuerk, GATS, Water and the Environment: 
Implications of the General Agreement on Trade in Services for Water Resources, World Wildlife Fund for 
Nature (2003); A. Lang, 'The GATS and Regulatory Autonomy: A Case Study of Social Regulation of the 
Water Industry', (2004) 7(4) Journal of International Economic Law 801. 
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and in many respects misleading picture of the impact of the trade regime. This is partly 
because such analysis tends to overestimate the coercive impact of WTO rules on real-
life regulatory processes. It is also because formal legal analysis fails to capture other,
arguably more important, ways in which the WTO system shapes global trade policies, 
through processes of persuasion, socialization, and knowledge production. Furthermore, 
such analyses focus solely on the direct constraining effect of the WTO legal system, and 
are blind to the indirect, context-dependent and often contradictory deeper social 
transformations to which that system gives rise. I argue therefore for the need to build a 
richer and more complex picture of the impacts of the WTO system on human rights 
protection. This is important not just because all aspects of the WTO ought to be subject 
to critical scrutiny. More importantly, it is because attention to the myriad processes 
through which the trade regime makes its influence felt, enables us to see how the trade 
regime can most productively help us collectively to re-imagine and re-create a better 
international trading order. 
 
In Part 3, my focus shifts from the trade regime to the human rights regime. In particular, 
I am interested in exploring what the engagement of human rights actors and languages 
has brought to debates about the international trading system. One of the primary 
questions I address is how the engagement of ‘human rights’ has reshaped and 
reconstituted debates about global economic governance. What productive function has it 
performed in these debates, and how (if at all) has it helped to progress them? What do 
human rights actors, as human rights actors, have to offer debates about the nature and 
future of the global trading order? In my view, the literature so far has been seriously 
hampered by the lack of coherent and clearly articulated answers to these questions. I 
argue that the present trade and human rights literature is implicitly structured by 
primarily three different conceptions of what human rights can offer. Human rights may 
be understood as: a set of rules providing substantive guidance to trade policy-makers 
and defining the parameters of acceptable trade policy; a set of political technologies 
which can be deployed to achieve particular trade policy outcomes; or a set of social 
objectives and values which at times run counter to the liberal trade project, and therefore 
necessitate decisions about complex policy trade-offs. I show how these conceptions have 
11
led commentators down some initially promising but in my view ultimately unsatisfying 
paths. I then go on offer two other models which may lead in more promising directions: 
I suggest first that human rights may be best understood less a source of substantive 
policy prescriptions and more as a trigger for policy learning; and second that human 
rights provide a means of challenging the norms of technical rationality which presently 
legitimate and structure the trade regime.  
 
It will be clear already that my intervention into this debate looks somewhat different 
from most, and for that reason it may be necessary to prepare the reader in advance for 
what to expect. For one thing, unlike many commentators, I do not attempt to take a 
position on the contested question of whether and how ‘trade liberalization’ undermines 
or enhances ‘the enjoyment of human rights’. Indeed, for the purposes of this article, I 
remain explicitly agnostic about the substantive critiques and defences which have been 
made of the trade regime from a human rights perspective. On such questions, the 
underlying normative commitment of my article is a thin one: it takes for granted that the 
critiques of the trade regime raise important issues; it proceeds from the presumption that 
the most fundamental issues they raise can never be finally settled; and it acknowledges 
the possibility that profound transformation in the trading order may be necessary to 
adequately respond to them. My primary concern is with the trade and human rights 
debate itself – specifically, whether and to what extent it enables or forecloses 
transformative change, whether and to what extent it maintains its ‘critical bite’. 
Furthermore, my account differs from those which take for granted that human rights 
represent a presumptively legitimate and appropriate standpoint from which to address 
trade issues. Of course, I find it perfectly natural that human rights bodies have taken an 
interest in trade issues, and I do not think it is necessary to justify that interest by asking 
what human rights bring to the debate. But I do think it is important to determine 
precisely what are the effects of the engagement of human rights is in the debate, and to 
think critically about the relative strengths and weaknesses of that engagement. And 
finally, I do not seek, as many others do, to map the relationship between trade and 
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human rights.18 This is partly because such exercises too often produce little more than 
marginally useful generalities. But more importantly, as explained further below,19 I am 
sceptical of that very project. The reality is that – now more than ever – the relationship 
between the two regimes is constantly evolving. I am less interested in what that 
relationship is than in the processes through which it is constantly becoming. Indeed, 
what I am most interested in are the ways that the trade and human rights debate itself is 
part of the processes by which that relationship is being socially reconstructed. 
 
2.  THE WTO AS CONSTRAINT: LEGAL CENTRALISM IN THE TRADE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS DEBATE 
Let me turn first of all to a question which has been a central focus of much of the work 
in the trade and human rights debate – namely, the impact of the international trading 
system on the promotion and protection of human rights. At the outset, a distinction 
should be drawn between accounts of the social impacts of international trade itself, and 
analyses of the impact of the international trade regime on the policies and policy-making 
processes of its Members. The criticisms I advance in this section apply only to the latter.  
 
In fact, it is worth taking a moment to note that the literature relating to the former 
question is typically highly sophisticated, and exhibits many of the features which I will 
be arguing are lacking in relation to work on the political impact of the trade regime. 
During the 1990s, when the trade and human rights debate was just beginning, discussion 
of the impact of trade liberalization on human rights arose in the context of a broader 
interest in the social impact of what is often referred to as ‘economic globalization’. 
Many accounts during this time drew heavily on contemporary scholarship on 
globalization – much of which was at pains to note the complexity, multi-dimensionality, 
multi-directionality, unpredictability and context-dependence of the effects of 
 
18 For a classic and sophisticated example, see T. Cottier, 'Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to 
Discover', (2002) 5(1) Journal of International Economic Law 111. 
19 See below, Section 3 of Part 3. 
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globalization.20 These lessons seem to have deeply influenced many commentators 
writing on trade liberalization and its effects on the enjoyment of human rights. Work 
within the trade and human rights literature has, for example, consistently demonstrated 
that the outcomes of international trade vary across time and place, and depend heavily 
on all aspects of the social, political, ideological, regulatory, cultural and economic 
context in which it takes place.21 Human rights scholars in particular have demonstrated a 
reluctance to generalize about the impacts of trade liberalization, preferring the claim that 
liberalization may – but need not – lead to improved living conditions.22 No doubt in part 
because these scholars saw their arguments as a corrective to some of the more 
Panglossian and overstated promises made about the benefits of liberal trade, they were 
less likely to make the same mistakes themselves. Moreover, the trade and human rights 
literature has also been noteworthy for the ways in which it has clarified the huge variety 
of different indirect pathways by which trade flows can affect social outcomes, as well as 
drawn attention to the complex mutual interactions between trade liberalization other 
socioeconomic trends such as the increasing concentration of capital, the growth of 
transnational enterprises, new waves of migration, and so on. Furthermore, this literature 
has played an important part in sensitizing us to the multidimensionality of trade’s 
impact. It has done this in part by focussing our attention not simply on traditional topics 
such as the effects of trade on growth, income and employment, but also on impacts on 
such factors as human health, equality and discrimination, and access to food, particularly 
of vulnerable groups. 
 
In my view, the question of the impact of the international trade regime – that is, the 
question of how the international trade regime influences the character, dynamics and 
operation of the international trading system – raises similar issues. That is to say, it is 
 
20 Classic texts with the body of scholarship I am talking about include: P.Q. Hirst and G. Thompson, 
Globalization in question: the international economy and the possibilities of governance (1999); J.A. 
Scholte, Globalization: a critical introduction (2000); D. Held and A.G. McGrew, Governing 
globalization: power, authority, and global governance (2002); D. Held and A.G. McGrew, The global 
transformations reader: an introduction to the globalization debate (2003). 
21 It is interesting to note in this regard that by and large the preferred methodology on the question of 
trade’s impacts has been the case study, an analytical form which is well suited to understanding and 
evaluating the specific dynamics of trade liberalization in particular contexts. 
22 For good examples, see the series of reports of the OHCHR referred to in n5 above. 
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complicated in a similar way by multi-dimensional, multi-modal, context-dependent and 
interactive effects. However, the literature on this question demonstrates little awareness 
of these complications. Instead, it tends to adopt a oversimplified framework in which the 
international trade regime (which in this context is the same as the WTO) acts primarily 
as an external constraint on its Members’ behaviour, by imposing a set of powerful, 
binding and enforceable legal obligations, requiring states to adopt certain kinds of 
policies, and refrain from adopting others. Within this framework, we know the impact of 
the trade regime primarily by looking at the rules it establishes, and the ways these rules 
are interpreted and applied.  
 
The framework I describe here has much in common with what Wolfe has described as a 
tendency towards ‘legal centralism’ in discussion of the international trade regime.23 
Drawing on Wolfe’s work, we can break it down into at least four more specific 
premises. One is that the WTO is essentially a rule-making institution, and that any 
influence that the WTO wields is primarily felt through the direct constraining effects of 
those rules. A second is that the nature and content of those rules can be ascertained most 
reliably and authoritatively by looking at the texts of WTO agreements, as well as the 
interpretation of those agreements through the decisions of Panels and the Appellate 
Body. A third concerns the centrality of the WTO. In part because of its hierarchical 
superiority in the (international) legal order, the WTO – and more specifically the rules it 
promulgates – are seen to play a uniquely central and powerful role in defining the nature 
of the trading order, and determining the conduct of participants within it. WTO rules, in 
other words, are presumptively thought to be more significant than other sources of 
normativity. The final premise is that the magnitude of the impact of WTO rules is 
determined, most significantly, by their precision and by the availability of effective 
mechanisms of coercive enforcement. This is because precision is vital if rules are to 
 
23 R. Wolfe, 'See You in Geneva? Legal (Mis)Representations of the Trading System', (2005) 11 European 
Journal of International Relations 339. The term ‘legal centralism’ is chosen by Wolfe in part because his 
critique draws much from the tradition of legal pluralist thought. My critique differs somewhat, in that it 
has its origins in a critique of the limitations of rational choice approaches to the study of institutions, so 
perhaps the term ‘legal centralism’ is less appropriate in the present context. See also M. Finnemore and 
S.J. Toope, 'Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer Views of Law and Politics', (2001) 55(3) International 
Organization 743 for another account which sees rational choice perspectives on institutions and positivist 
understandings of law as closely related, and often associated.  
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provide meaningful guides for actor behaviour, and enforcement is crucial to ensuring 
that the strategic costs and benefits associated with particular course of action are 
significantly modified.  
 
While they almost always remain implicit, it is not hard to see the ways in which these 
premises strongly influence the trade and human rights debate, and the guide the 
arguments deployed in it. Most commentators, for example, proceed as if we know the 
‘human rights impact’ of the trade regime by analyzing its rules. Simplified, the typical 
line of argument is in two stages: first, commentators typically scrutinize WTO 
agreements carefully to determine the kinds of policy choices these agreements may 
require or proscribe, and second, these policy choices are themselves carefully analyzed 
to determine whether and in what ways they may respectively undermine or enhance the 
enjoyment of human rights in particular circumstances. For example, initially in response 
to the EC – Hormones dispute24, some commentators have expressed concern that certain 
provisions of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS Agreement) may undermine the ability of Members to put in place adequate food 
safety regimes in respect of new and potentially dangerous foods – and that such regimes 
often play an important part in promoting and protecting the right to health.25 Another 
very familiar example is the concern that TRIPs article 31(f) may limit the import and 
export of generic drugs – a measure which, again, might be necessary in the fight against 
particular health epidemics, and thus the promotion of the right to health.26 A third is 
work on the impacts of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA): concern has been expressed 
that this agreements limits the circumstances in which many developing countries can put 
in place protective measures such as tariffs, subsidies and safeguards mechanisms, which 
may in some circumstances be the only effective means of protecting vulnerable 
 
24 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) – Complaint by the United States,
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998:I, 135, Panel Report, WT/DS26/R/USA, DSR 1998:III, 699, 
adopted 13 February 1998. 
25 Eg, A. Orford, 'Contesting Globalization: A Feminist Perspective on the Future of Human Rights', (1998) 
8(2) Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 171; C. Dommen, 'Raising Human Rights Concerns 
in the World Trade Organization: Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies', (2002) 24(1) Human Rights 
Quarterly 1; G. Marceau, 'WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights', (2002) 13(4) European Journal of 
International Law 753. 
26 See above n15. 
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communities from the dislocations caused by agricultural import liberalization.27 The 
point is that investigations into the influence and impact of the trade regime on human 
rights focus primarily (often exclusively) on the degree of constraint its laws impose on 
the policy choices of its Member states, so that assessing its impact becomes first and 
foremost a formal legal question. In such analyses, the technical details of WTO 
agreements take on paramount importance, and the pronouncements of the Appellate 
Body in high profile cases are carefully scrutinized for their implications for Members’ 
policy autonomy. Typically, the analysis ends at this point: once textual inadequacy or 
ambiguity is identified, there is usually little attempt to investigate the real-world impacts 
of those texts on regulatory choices and decision-making processes. 
 
The legal centralist framework, and the forms of analysis and critique to which it gives 
rise, have achieved a kind of commonsense status in discussions of the impact of the 
trade regime. In many respects this is for good reason: my claim is not that this 
framework is wrong in any simple way, rather that it is seriously incomplete, and that on 
its own it generates a potentially misleading map of the impacts of the trade regime. In 
what follows, I set out four different dimensions for which this framework fails 
adequately to account, and then go on to explain why these inadequacies matter so much. 
 
1. The salience and centrality of WTO law 
 
My first concern is related to the normative centrality or ‘salience’ of WTO obligations – 
that is, the extent to which WTO obligations are central or peripheral in policy-making 
processes, and the degree of importance which national policy-makers place on them in 
practice. The legal centralist framework encourages us to think of WTO obligations as 
enjoying a high degree of salience, certainly compared to other international legal 
 
27 See, for example, C. Breining-Kaufman, 'The Right to Food and Trade in Agriculture' in T. Cottier, E. 
Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 341; OHCHR, ‘Globalization 
and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights’, E/CN.4/2002/54, 15 January 2002; Simons, “Human 
Security, Corporate Accountability and the Regulation of International Trade”, CCHS Human Security 
Fellowship Working Paper, March 2004; C.G. Gonzalez, 'Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries', (2002) 27(2) Columbia Journal of 
Environmental Law 433 M. Ritchie and K. Dawkins, 'WTO Food and Agricultural Rules: Sustainable 
Agriculture and the Human Right to Food', (2000) 9(1) Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 9. 
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obligations. Primarily, of course, this is because of the WTO’s dispute settlement 
mechanism, and in particular the existence of a credible threat of sanctions for non-
compliance. It is also because of the relative precision of many WTO obligations (which 
in principle augments their capacity to act as a guide to behaviour), as well as their 
hierarchical superiority (which tends generate a perception of salience as compared to say 
domestic sources of legal normativity). Furthermore, the present high levels of 
compliance with formal WTO dispute settlement rulings is often treated as sufficient 
empirical evidence of the strong coercive force of WTO obligations.28 
But while these indications are clearly significant, they tell only part of the story. They 
must be balanced against a variety of other factors, which give us good reason to suspect 
that WTO legal constraints are not in all circumstances as central to national policy-
making processes as is often assumed. For instance, it is important to remember that high 
levels of compliance with dispute settlement rulings provide direct evidence only of 
levels of post-dispute compliance. This kind of evidence tells us little if anything about 
the extent to which WTO law influences day-to-day regulatory decision-making, in those 
vast majority of cases which never reach dispute settlement.29 In such cases, whether 
WTO obligations are central or only peripheral in decision-making processes depends on 
much more than their precision and the existence of a credible threat of sanctions. Their 
practical impact depends, for example, on a high degree of awareness of relevant WTO 
provisions amongst national governmental decision-makers, as well as on the existence of 
routinized and systematic practices of WTO compliance review as a standard part of 
regulatory decision-making. We have surprisingly little empirical evidence on the extent 
to which WTO obligations are systematically considered in domestic legal processes in 
this way. At the very least, however, we would expect this to vary considerably from 
country to country, and from issue area to issue area – depending on the resources and 
administrative capacity of domestic governments, the availability of local officials with 
relevant WTO expertise, previous dealings between particular government departments 
 
28 For a selection of the literature on compliance with the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, see (2002) 
33:4 Law and Policy in International Business (Symposium issue).  
29 The same point is made by Dunoff in J.L. Dunoff, 'Why Constitutionalism Now? Text, Context and the 
Historical Contingency of Ideas', (2005) 1(1-2) Journal of International Law and International Relations 
191, 206. 
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and the WTO legal system.30 Many countries, it seems, find it more efficient to rely on 
post hoc complaints by trading partners and exporters as the most efficient method of 
ensuring acceptable levels of compliance with WTO law.31 
Moreover, it has long been recognised that compliance with legal rules depends not 
solely on the existence of a sanctioning mechanism, but also to a significant extent on 
their congruence with pre-existing value commitments in the regulated polity.32 It may be 
argued that the great lesson of 60 years of experience with international trade law is that 
such law cannot be effective in the long run in the absence of a broad and lasting 
consensus that its strictures are necessary and mutually beneficial.33 There is no doubt 
that at some level this consensus currently exists, but few would claim that it is equally 
strong in all circumstances. Even at the level of individual governmental agencies, WTO 
law represents only one of many normative claims to which regulatory decision-makers 
are subject. Even apart from their embeddedness in local political cultures, domestic 
regulatory authorities are also influenced by very strong organizational cultures, 
including powerful social norms concerning the kinds of policy choices which are 
legitimate, desirable and politically possible. Where WTO norms are not internalized into 
that culture, even the hardest of coercive legal mechanisms can be relatively ineffective 
in fundamentally altering the form and content of policy-making processes. Indeed, a 
number of incidents in the history of GATT/WTO dispute settlement illustrate this 
 
30 Anecdotal evidence, from interviews with the legal departments in the governments of a variety of WTO 
Members, suggests the (unsurprising) conclusion that the experience of being the subject of WTO 
proceedings in a particular regulatory sub-field (be it quarantine, or environmental measures), has the effect 
of sensitizing decision-makers in that area to the existence of WTO rules, and increasing their impact on 
future decision-making processes. 
31 Again, anecdotal evidence from interviews with numerous governmental officials suggests that, at least 
in respect of legislative and regulatory measures in place prior to the creation of the WTO, it is common 
practice not to review such measures systematically for WTO compliance, but rather to wait to see if 
trading partners raise them as legal issues. 
32 This basic point has been made by many commentators, eg: T.M. Franck, The power of legitimacy 
among nations (1990); R. Goodman and D. Jinks, 'How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law', (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621, 632. 
33 The experience over the first decades of the GATT with regional trade agreements, agriculture, and 
(later) with so-called Voluntary Export Restraints surely suggests that without such a consensus, it will 
usually be a relatively simple matter to find a way around even tightly drafted legal rules. This is not, it 
should be noted, the lesson that is typically drawn. It is more usual to suggest that the history of the GATT 
teaches us that international trade commitments cannot be effective without a binding and enforceable 
dispute resolution: eg, J. Pauwelyn, 'The Transformation of World Trade', (2005) 104 Michigan Law 
Review 1. No doubt there is some truth to both accounts.  
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general effect well.34 Furthermore, as many have noted in other contexts, precisely the act 
of making the GATT/WTO legal system ‘harder’ – that is to say, made more legally 
precise, subject to binding and coercive dispute resolution, and so on – may in some 
circumstances actually undermine the normative cohesion on which its effectiveness is 
(partially) based. Finnemore and Toope, for example, note that judicialization may lead 
to reduced levels of adherence to the ‘spirit’ of the law, in part by encouraging aggressive 
legal argumentative strategies, and fostering an environment in which compliance with 
legal formalities is understood as all that is required.35 
Even to the extent that we acknowledge the importance of the coercive machinery of the 
WTO dispute settlement system in ensuring the effectiveness of WTO obligations – and 
of course to a certain extent we must – we should still be careful not to over-generalize 
the contexts in which WTO law plays a central role. In many circumstances, threats of 
trade sanctions for non-compliance can be less that perfectly credible or immediate, and 
therefore less effective. For example, a decision-maker wishing to enact a potentially 
WTO-inconsistent measure may find the threat of WTO action less compelling in the 
absence of a relatively substantial trade impact of the measure in question, a relatively 
powerful export lobby in the complaining country (which is both sensitized to the 
possibility of WTO proceedings and has the resources and political capital to press for 
 
34 There are at least three obvious and interesting examples of this. The first is the history of the DISC (later 
FSC) case, recounted by Hudec in R.E. Hudec, Enforcing international trade law: the evolution of the 
modern GATT legal system (1993), 99 – a history which to my mind illustrates as much as anything the 
difficulty of ensuring compliance with trade law where the WTO is seen by regulators to be over-extending 
itself, into regulatory fields which are not within its core perceived competence. The second and third 
examples (which teach the same lesson) are the post-ruling histories of the Hormones and Varietals 
disputes, see D. Wuger, 'Never Ending Story: The Implementation Phase in the Dispute between the EC 
and the United States on Hormone-Treated Beef', (2002) 33(4) Law and Policy in International Business 
777and J.P. Whitlock, 'Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products: Lessons for Future SPS and 
Agricultural Trade Disputes', (2002) 33(4) Law and Policy in International Business 741, 761. 
35 M. Finnemore and S.J. Toope, 'Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer Views of Law and Politics', (2001) 
55(3) International Organization 743, 753, see also J. Goldstein and L.L. Martin, 'Legalization, Trade 
Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note', (2000) 54(3) International Organization 603; 
E.L. Lutz and K. Sikkink, 'International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America', (2000) 54(3) 
International Organization 633; L.R. Helfer, 'Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations 
Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes', (2002) 102(7) 
Columbia Law Review 1832; R. Goodman and D. Jinks, 'How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law', (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621. 
20
them), and of sufficient levels of trade flows between the two relevant countries for the 
threat of sanctions to ‘bite’.  
 
What I have been calling the salience of WTO obligations also depends in practice on 
what these obligations actually require – that is, the extent to which they actually do 
impose genuinely burdensome obligations on national decision-makers, which require 
them to take substantively different decisions from those which they might otherwise 
prefer. This is largely an interpretive or doctrinal question and clearly one which cannot 
be answered adequately without detailed consideration of specific legal issues. Much 
depends on the particular provision and the specific circumstances at issue in any 
particular context, as well as on the perceptions of the individual commentator. 
Nevertheless, it is worth making the generally under-emphasized observation that 
obligations in WTO agreements are often ambiguously worded, or impose procedural 
rather than substantive requirements, or are hedged around by a variety of overlapping 
safeguards, exemptions and flexibilities.36 Taken together, these features are often more 
productive of confusion and uncertainty than precision – they look more like flexibility 
rather than constraint – and in fact make a variety of legal strategies available to 
determined regulators wishing to pursue a path of action in apparent defiance of WTO 
requirements. Of course, this is less true in some areas than in others. Some disciplines 
are indeed extremely precise and difficult to legitimately work around, tariff bindings 
being perhaps the obvious example. But in my view the existence of significant flexibility 
is particularly apparent in relation to constraints on those areas of policy-making – such 
as regulation concerning food safety, consumer protection, environmental protection, 
among other matters – which tend at present to concern human rights scholars and 
commentators the most.  
 
Finally, it is important to be realistic about the relative centrality of formal WTO 
obligations as determinants of trade policy, and more generally as determinants of the 
character of the international trading system. The imperatives of WTO law, of course, are 
 
36 For a substantiation of this claim in relation to a particular legal question, see A. Lang, 'The GATS and 
Regulatory Autonomy: A Case Study of Social Regulation of the Water Industry', (2004) 7(4) Journal of 
International Economic Law 801. 
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only some among a very large number of pressures facing regulatory authorities – indeed, 
only some among a diversity of legal pressures facing them.37 Structural and other factors 
driving trade liberalization may in the end be much more important than WTO 
obligations in driving trade liberalization.38 It is certainly arguable that recent periods of 
dramatic liberalization in international trade (structural adjustment in developing 
countries during the 1970s and 80s being an obvious example) have had little to do with 
legal obligations imposed by the international trade regime, at least not directly. We may 
also legitimately wonder how big a difference increasing the formal flexibilities provided 
to developing countries under WTO agreements may actually make – it is interesting how 
often trade commentators find themselves arguing that countries ought to us existing 
flexibilities in WTO agreements more than they currently do.39 It is hard to resist the 
impression that (at least in an significant proportion of cases) the importance of WTO 
obligations can be somewhat marginal to the decisions of trade policy-makers. Of course, 
I don’t wish to stretch the point: my claim is not, of course, that WTO obligations are 
unimportant. It is merely to correct what I see as a tendency to over-emphasize the 
determinative role of these obligations on trade policy. 
 
2. The multiple modalities of WTO effects 
 
If in the previous section I argued that the legal centralist frame tends to overestimate the 
constraining impact of WTO law, in this section my claim is that it underestimates or 
overlooks a variety of other important mechanisms by which the international trade 
 
37 Indeed, to take the point one step further, public regulation is far from the only legal pressure guiding the 
activities of private traders: R. Wai, 'Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory 
Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization', (2002) 40(2) Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 209. 
38 For interesting recent work attempting to measure the impact of the trade regime, see Rose, “Do We 
Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?” (2004) 94 American Economic Review; Subramanian and 
Wei, “The WTO Promotes Trade Strongly but Unevenly,” NBER Working Paper 10024, (2003)’ Tomz, 
Goldstein, and Rivers, “Membership Has Its Privileges: The Impact of GATT on International Trade,” 
(2004), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/TomzGoldsteinRivers2005a.pdf; Rose, “Response to 
Tomz, Goldstein, and Rivers, “Membership Has Its Privileges: The Impact of GATT on International 
Trade””, (2005), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/Tomz.pdf; Gowa and Kim, “An Exclusive 
Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950-1994”, available at 
www.yale.edu/irspeakers/Gowa2006.
39 See, to take one among many possible examples, OHCHR, ‘Liberalization of trade in services and human 
rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002. 
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regime makes its influence felt. There is a large and growing body of literature – much of 
it informed by strands of constructivist thinking and drawing on traditions within 
sociological enquiry – attempting both to theorize and empirically map the various non-
compulsory40 modes of influence and power which international organizations wield.41 
Within this literature, international institutions like the WTO are understood not so much 
as exogenous constraints on state behaviour, but rather as social environments in which 
states (or the individuals who represent them) come to redefine, reformulate and re-
conceive the kinds of trade policies they wish to pursue. There are at least three relevant 
lines of enquiry which this literature pursues. 
 
First of all, we can think of international organizations as technologies for the production, 
authorization and dissemination of policy norms. This is a conceptual model which has 
been developed primarily in studies of international institutions working in the fields of 
development and human rights, among others.42 A number of scholars have argued, in 
fact, that normative diffusion represents the primary function of many international 
institutions, and the most powerful mechanism at their disposal to influence the 
behaviour of states.43 There is a sophisticated literature on the various microprocesses by 
which this kind of normative diffusion takes place. Some commentators concentrate on 
the role of persuasion, argumentation and conscious deliberation. They see international 
institutions as forums for the engagement of these deliberative processes, where state 
 
40 I borrow the term ‘compulsory power’ here from Barnett and Duvall’s introductory chapter in Barnett 
and Duvall (eds.), Power in Global Governance (2003), 1-32. 
41 See, for example, A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The new sovereignty: compliance with international 
regulatory agreements (1995); M. Finnemore, National interests in international society (1996); M.N. 
Barnett and M. Finnemore, 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', (1999) 
53(4) International Organization 699; T. Risse-Kappen, C. Ropp Steve and K. Sikkink, The power of 
human rights: international norms and domestic change (1999); A.I. Johnston, 'Treating International 
Institutions as Social Environments', (2001) 45(4) International Studies Quarterly 487; R. Goodman and D. 
Jinks, 'How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law', (2004) 54 Duke Law 
Journal 621, and more generally A.S. Yee, 'The causal effects of ideas on policies', (1996) 50(1) 
International Organization 69; J.T. Checkel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', 
(1998) 50(2) World Politics 324. For international legal scholarship from a somewhat similar perspective 
see H.H. Koh, 'Transnational Legal Process', (1996) 75(1) Nebraska Law Review 181; J. Brunnee and S.J. 
Toope, 'International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law', 
(2000) 39(1) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 19. 
42 See, eg, M. Finnemore, National interests in international society (1996); T. Risse-Kappen, C. Ropp 
Steve and K. Sikkink, The power of human rights: international norms and domestic change (1999). 
43 Ibid. 
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representatives are prompted to ‘think harder’ about issues in light of persuasive 
evidence, and over time come to change their mind to accord more closely to the 
dominant normative framework favoured by the international institution in question.44 
Others focus more on acculturation – that is, the often tacit processes by which members 
of a organization come to share its normative commitments. Within international 
organizations, these commentators note, psycho-social pressures to conform arise from 
processes of identification, shaming, back-patting, status maximization, habituation, and 
so on.45 And others still concentrate on the discursive practices by which norms are 
propagated, communicated and valorized within international organizations. They show 
how the distinctive conceptual frameworks, modes of speaking, and forms of argument 
characteristic of particular international regimes can construct particular policy 
orientations as appropriate, rational, modern, legitimate, and so on.46 These three 
processes – persuasion, acculturation and discursive legitimation – can act directly by 
affecting those policy-makers who are themselves active participants in a regime, as well 
as indirectly by working on special interest groups who, in turn, persuade domestic 
audiences and political leaders.47 
Although to date there is still little empirical work on these processes, there are strong 
reasons to think that they play an important role within the present international trade 
regime. Through many of its institutional practices, the WTO tends to teach states about 
the kinds of trade policies which are desirable and in their best interests, even if the trade 
 
44 On the role of persuasion, see for example T. Risse, '"Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World 
Politics', (2000) 54(1) International Organization 1; A.I. Johnston, 'Treating International Institutions as 
Social Environments', (2001) 45(4) International Studies Quarterly 487, and references cited therein.  
45 See A.I. Johnston, 'Treating International Institutions as Social Environments', (2001) 45(4) International 
Studies Quarterly 487; R. Goodman and D. Jinks, 'How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law', (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621, drawing heavily on a wide variety of sociological 
literature on pressures on individuals to conform in social groups. 
46 For commentators who make this claim in relation to the trade regime, see D.K. Tarullo, 'Logic, Myth, 
and the International Economic Order', (1985) 26 Harvard International Law Journal 533; D. Kennedy, 
'Turning to Market Democracy: A Tale of Two Architectures', (1991) 32(3) Harvard International Law 
Journal 373; C. Ochoa, 'Advancing the Language of Human Rights in a Global Economic Order: An 
Analysis of a Discourse', (2003) 23(1) Boston College Third World Law Journal 57; A. Lang, 'Beyond 
Formal Obligation: The Trade Regime and the Making of Political Priorities', (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 403. See also, more generally A.S. Yee, 'The causal effects of ideas on policies', (1996) 
50(1) International Organization 69. 
47 R. Goodman and D. Jinks, 'How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law', 
(2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621, 654. 
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policy obligations imposed by WTO law do not correspond precisely with this ideal. 
There are, for example, a number of venues within the current WTO system which we 
might expect to function as sites of normative socialization: accession negotiations teach 
new Members what it means to be a modern liberal trading nation; the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism helps to produce and disseminate norms concerning the proper shape 
and objectives of domestic economic policy; while technical assistance programs are (or 
at least have the potential to be) the mechanism by which government leaders are taught 
norms of appropriate trade policy behaviour.48 Furthermore, there are indications that 
socialization and persuasion historically played an important role in producing outcomes 
in the GATT system. A number of commentators have noted that, at least in its first few 
decades, one of the primary achievements of the GATT system was the creation of a 
close-knit community of trade experts and policy-makers. Through regular interaction, 
these players developed strong bonds of trust as well as shared cognitive frameworks, 
normative commitments, internalized social roles and expectations, and habits of thought, 
all of which contributed to the maintenance of a stable elite preference for trade 
liberalization.49 This social network, it is argued, was a primary factor in creating and 
maintaining a generalized and long-term commitment to liberal trade among policy-
makers in the post-war political order. While the nature, size, intensity and orientation of 
transnational policy networks in the field of international trade have of course changed 
 
48 To these three might be added multilateral trade negotiations themselves. For example, as Weissman has 
noted, while it is common to understand the inclusion of IP in the Uruguay Round negotiations as a blatant 
exercise in power politics for the benefit of IP producers from developed countries, the reality is more 
complex than that. The UR negotiations provided an impetus for the production and dissemination of a 
huge amount of research into the potential benefits of stronger IP protection for developing countries. 
Weissman notes that this research, and related processes of persuasion, were at least convincing enough to 
encourage prominent developing countries to believe that TRIPs was something they could live with: R. 
Weissman, 'A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual 
Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries', (1996) 
17(4) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 1069. 
49 This point has been made by a number of commentators: R.E. Hudec, Enforcing international trade law: 
the evolution of the modern GATT legal system (1993); A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes, The new sovereignty: 
compliance with international regulatory agreements (1995), 278ff; R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, 'The Club 
Model of Multilateral Cooperation and the World Trade Organization: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy' 
in R.B. Porter, R. Vernon and G. Harvard University. Center for Business and (eds.), Efficiency, equity, and 
legitimacy: the multilateral trading system at the millennium (2001), xvi; J.H.H. Weiler, 'The Rule of 
Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats-Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute 
Settlement', (2001) 35(2) Journal of World Trade 191, 334. See also generally, P.M. Haas, 'Introduction. 
Epistemic Communities and International Policy Co-ordination"', (Winter 1992) 46(1) International 
Organization 1. 
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since that time, there is every reason to assume that the role of the WTO in creating and 
shaping such networks is equally significant today.  
 
One important aside: I should not be misunderstood as suggesting that the international 
trading system is always or necessarily associated with the global projection of a 
particular economic ideology. I have argued elsewhere that literature on the trade regime 
is too often characterized by an uncritical assumption that the normative framework of 
the regime is naturally associated with economic neoliberalism, or with radical free 
market fundamentalism.50 Historical scholarship reminds us that the values and norms 
disseminated through the international trade regime are fluctuating and contingent. In 
fact, the post-war regime began very far from free market fundamentalism, has been 
associated with a variety of political and normative programs since, and has always been 
characterized by a degree of contestation and internal contradiction.51 Research into 
mechanisms of persuasion and socialization within the WTO, while in my view vital, 
needs therefore to be undertaken carefully, so as to make no assumptions about the 
character, durability and orientation of its normative influence. 
 
Secondly, other scholars have focussed on the role of international institutions in the 
production and dissemination of socially sanctioned knowledge about the world. This 
‘knowledge-production function’ of international institutions has been conceptualized 
and described in different ways by different commentators. One helpful model rests on a 
linguistic analogy: international institutions are associated with particular languages (the 
languages of human rights, development, trade, and so on) and are understood in their 
character as discursive environments. These languages or discourses, it is said, provide 
actors with a particular repertoire of categories and concepts with which to make sense of 
the world. They are founded on, and express, particular theories about how the world 
operates, and provide an interpretive framework through which we can access various 
aspects of reality. This linguistic analogy allows us to understand a variety of often 
 
50 Lang, “Whose trade issues? What trade values? Cognitive and Institutional Change in the International 
Trading System” (forthcoming, copy on file with author). 
51 The classic text making this point is J.G. Ruggie, 'International regimes, transactions, and change: 
embedded liberalism and the postwar economic order' in S.D. Krasner (ed.) International Regimes (1983), 
195. 
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hidden ways in which international institutions wield power and influence social and 
political outcomes. For example, Barnett and Finnemore describe international 
organizations as exercising the power of classification and the power to fix meanings to 
social phenomena.52 They note that, in various circumstances and for various purposes, 
the World Bank defines people as peasants, day labourers, farmers, or others, and that 
this classification has important consequences for whether these people are understood as 
possessing the kinds of knowledge useful to guide the development process.53 Similarly, 
they note (drawing on the work of Escobar54) that the World Bank is a key venue for the 
authoritative definition of the notion of development. The power to define the social 
meaning of development is crucial, they suggest, because it 
 
determines not only what constitutes the activity (what development is) but also who (or 
what) is considered powerful and privileged, that is, who gets to do the developing … 
and who is the object of development.55 
Similar observations can be made in respect of the WTO. The WTO’s power of 
classification is perhaps illustrated through its ability to authoritatively label particular 
governmental activity as an ‘intervention’ (or a ‘trade barrier’ or an ‘impediment to 
trade’). Such a label matters, because it can act to mobilize constituencies for or against 
the activity in question, as well as to frame debates about its desirability, and define the 
range of permissible arguments in circulation in those debates. Moreover, the WTO acts 
as is a venue in which the key terms of trade discourse are constructed, contested, 
authorized and disseminated. It is a key site for the social construction of the meaning of 
‘free trade’ – that is, the definition of the purpose and nature of the liberal trade project. 
The importance of this is the same as in the case of development cited above: it helps to 
determine what constitutes free trade, who gets to do it, and (indirectly) who benefits. 
The WTO, in other words, can be understood as a mechanism for the social construction 
 
52 M.N. Barnett and M. Finnemore, 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', 
(1999) 53(4) International Organization 699. 
53 Ibid., 711, referring to G. Gran, 'Beyond African Famines: Whose Knowledge Matters?' (1986) 11 
Alternatives 275. 
54 A. Escobar, Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the third world (1994). 
55 M.N. Barnett and M. Finnemore, 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', 
(1999) 53(4) International Organization 699, 711. 
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of the international trading order, for defining the categories through which actors 
interpret the trading system and their place within it, or at least mediating struggles over 
them. In this way, rather than simply constraining states’ behaviour, it enables (particular 
kinds of) action, by providing a conceptual framework within which particular kinds of 
actions are made meaningful.56 Another, less abstract model focusses on the ways in 
which international institutions produce and disseminate technical knowledge about the 
causal mechanisms which govern the operation of various aspects of international life. 
International organizations might, most simply, be involved in the production of reports 
and technical documents which explicitly develop causal models for guiding policy 
development. They might also facilitate the creation of knowledge networks, mediating 
the channels through which policy-makers are exposed to particular forms of expertise, 
and regulating the form in which policy ideas are introduced to decision-makers.57 The 
applicability of these insights to the WTO hardly needs explanation.  
 
The third and final set of mechanisms are of a different kind, more familiar to mainstream 
thinking about the role of international organizations in political life. In this story, 
international organizations like the WTO shape political outcomes by influencing the 
dynamics of domestic political debates about – in the case of the WTO – trade policy. 
While this body of literature is like the previous two in that it is interested in the 
processes by which state preferences are created and redefined, the focus here is less on 
the cognitive microprocesses by which individuals come to an understanding of their 
interests, and more on the social processes by which the (fixed) preferences of a 
multitude of individuals are aggregated within a state polity.58 
One way in which the WTO influences domestic political debates, for example, is by 
changing the constellation of actors involved in them. Often it can have the effect of 
expanding trade policy debates to include foreign actors. As Swenarchuk has noted, one 
 
56 The kind of power I am talking about here overlaps with the notion of ‘productive power’ used by 
Barnett and Duvall in their introductory chapter to Power in Global Governance (2003), 20. 
57 See, for example, P.A. Hall, The political power of economic ideas: Keynesianism across nations (1989); 
A.S. Yee, 'The causal effects of ideas on policies', (1996) 50(1) International Organization 69, 92. 
58 A.I. Johnston, 'Treating International Institutions as Social Environments', (2001) 45(4) International 
Studies Quarterly 487, 487. 
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practical effect of the national treatment obligation in WTO law – by which foreign 
products are entitled to equivalent treatment to that granted to their domestic equivalents 
– is to give foreign producers an interest in the governmental regulation of domestic 
businesses.59 In some circumstances, the result has been direct lobbying by foreign 
businesses in favour of policies of domestic liberalization.60 More directly, the WTO also 
facilitates the input of foreign actors into domestic trade policy decision-making, by 
opening up intergovernmental channels through which affected foreign businesses can 
make their complaints heard, as well as by focussing international attention on obstacles 
to trade in particular countries. Furthermore, the WTO can also lead to the formation of 
new actors on the domestic political scene, by altering the political opportunity structure 
facing various interest groups.61 For example, it was in significant part the expansion of 
the WTO into the arena of services that lead to the creation of new service industry 
coalitions and business networks loosely tied together by the new concept of ‘trade in 
services’.62 While such groups are important actors within the trade regime itself, they 
also are directly involved in domestic debates concerning liberalization policies relevant 
to a variety of service industries. Finally, WTO processes might more indirectly lead to 
changes in the range of actors involved in domestic political debates. For example, the 
creation of domestic systems of IP protection, in compliance with international trade law, 
may lead to the creation of new domestic constituencies in favour of further and more 
extensive IP protection.63 
Closely related are the processes by which the international trading system can help to 
mobilize actors in favour of liberal trade, who might otherwise remain relatively 
politically disengaged. Thus, for example, numerous commentators have noted that the 
 
59 M. Swenarchuk, From Global to Local: GATS Impacts on Canadian Municipalities (2002). 
60 See, for example, D. Roseman, 'Domestic Regulation and Trade in Telecommunications Services: 
Experience and Prospects under the GATS' in A. Mattoo and P. Sauvé (eds.), Domestic regulation and 
service trade liberalization (2003), 83. 
61 Duina provides fascinating examples of this process in the context of Mercosur and NAFTA: F.G. Duina, 
The social construction of free trade: the European Union, NAFTA, and MERCOSUR (2006). 
62 Some examples might include the Coalition of Service Industries, European Services Forum, Global 
Services Coalition, Australian Services Roundtable, Hong Kong Coalition of Service Industries, among 
many other national lobby groups. 
63 I take this example from Kingsbury: B. Kingsbury, 'The Concept of Compliance as a Function of 
Competing Conceptions of International Law', (1998) 19(2) Michigan Journal of International Law 345. 
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reciprocal nature of international trade obligations – by making access to foreign markets 
conditional on inward liberalization measures – can mobilize export-oriented domestic 
producers in favour of domestic liberalization projects, and thus alleviate to some extent 
the well-known public choice problem characteristic of domestic trade policy.64 
Furthermore, periodic multilateral trade negotiations provide ongoing opportunities for 
domestic policy elites to continuously revisit trade policy questions, and to re-energize 
domestic pro-liberalization interest groups. (Interestingly, in direct contrast to widespread 
perceptions, multilateral trade negotiations are only sometimes instigated and shaped by 
already-mobilized industry groups. It is at least as common for governments to use such 
negotiations as a means to galvanize such groups, and proactively ask for their input in 
defining and supporting national trade policy priorities.65) Of course, these processes can 
work in the other direction: Goldstein and Martin note, for example, the way in which the 
ratification and incorporation of international trade agreements by domestic legislative 
authorities can provide a focal point for those groups resistant to liberal trade agenda, and 
in favour of more protectionist policies.66 
Finally, the existence of the WTO and its legal system can alter the dynamics of domestic 
trade debates by adding to the array of arguments that can legitimately be deployed in 
such debates. Hudec has noted, for example, the way in which domestic policy-makers 
can (whether or not there is strict legal justification) use the excuse of WTO obligations 
to justify politically unpopular liberalization measures.67 In the United States for 
example, as Destler has described, policy elites have been able to galvanize support for 
specific liberalization initiatives by referring to the need to maintain American leadership 
in international economic affairs, as well as to maintain the integrity and stability of the 
international trading system more generally. He also describes the ways in which the 
 
64 This is a commonly noted effect of the trade regime: eg, J.H. Jackson, The world trading system: law and 
policy of international economic relations (1997); I.M. Destler, American trade politics (2005). 
65 See, for example, Hurrell and Narlikar, “The New Politics of Confrontation? Developing Countries at 
Cancun and Beyond” (2006) 20(4) Global Society (forthcoming); A. Hurrell, 'Hegemony, liberalism and 
global order: what space for would-be great powers?' (2006) 82(1) International Affairs 1; A. Narlikar, 
'Peculiar chauvinism or strategic calculation? Explaining the negotiating strategy of a rising India', (2006) 
82(1) International Affairs 59. 
66 J. Goldstein and L.L. Martin, 'Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary 
Note', (2000) 54(3) International Organization 603. 
67 R.E. Hudec, Enforcing international trade law: the evolution of the modern GATT legal system (1993). 
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international trading system has allowed American trade policy elites to respond to 
domestic political pressures in new ways: for example, responding to widespread concern 
about the US trade deficit by waging an aggressive campaign to open foreign markets, 
rather than the more traditional response of raising barriers to imports.68 
To summarize: the international trade regime does far more than simply place formal 
legal obligations on trade policy-makers. It influences the constellation of actors involved 
in policy-making processes, helps to establish the terms of their discussion, shapes their 
understanding of the purpose of their endeavour and of the liberal trade project more 
generally, helps to generate shared conceptions about the boundaries of acceptable and 
legitimate trade policy, and provides sanctioned technical knowledge and cognitive tools 
for the formulation of trade policy interests. Contrary to the implicit claims of legal 
centralism, these processes are likely to be far more significant – if less visible – than 
processes of legal compulsion. 
 
3. Multi-directionality and indirect impacts 
 
A third criticism of the legal centralist frame is that it tends to focus our attention on the 
direct and immediate impacts of WTO law in the context of individual disputes. We are 
encouraged to understand the impact of WTO obligations solely in terms of the degree of 
constraint they impose on, or freedom they provide to, domestic authorities. Significantly 
less attention is paid, however, to the longer-term and more indirect social impacts of the 
WTO legal system as its legal norms embed themselves into particular socio-political 
contexts. Attention to these deeper effects yields a vastly richer and more complex 
picture of the social effects of the WTO legal system: in which the impact of international 
legal norms is acknowledged to be unpredictable and often unintended69, dynamic, highly 
context-dependent, and multidirectional. 
 
68 I.M. Destler, American trade politics (2005). 
69 Martin and Simmons have noted the tendency of ‘secondary’ rules in particular (concerning how 
substantive rules are made) to have significant unanticipated effects: L.L. Martin and B. Simmons, 
'Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions', (1998) 52(4) International Organization 729, 
750. 
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Take the impact of the GATT/WTO system on patterns of protectionism. We are 
accustomed to thinking of the GATT/WTO as constraining protectionism, putting in 
place an expanding collection of prohibitive rules which gradually tend to eliminate 
protectionist policies. And, of course, this is a large part of the story. But in addition to 
these direct and most visible effects, the prohibitions set out in the GATT/WTO legal 
framework have generated a variety of often surprising indirect effects, which have 
ultimately played a crucial role in shaping the contemporary international trading order. 
For example, while the GATT/WTO system has certainly reduced the incidence of 
protectionist policies, it has also tended to shift the focus of protectionist efforts onto 
those measures which remain permissible under that law. Thus Hughes and Waelbroeck 
tell the story of the a simultaneous decrease in tariff restrictions and an increased use of 
export subsidies and production subsidies during the 1960s and 1970s, both by 
industrialized country governments, and (partly as a consequence) by the developing 
country counterparts.70 This reconfiguration of the instruments of trade policy, they 
argue, in some cases served to entrench and even facilitate protectionist pressures, 
primarily because it provided new – often less transparent and less easily reversible – 
avenues for the expression of these pressures. In fact, one can plausibly tell the story of 
the postwar trading system as a complex game, in which Members agreed to certain 
restrictions on their trade policy options – while leaving certain other options 
conspicuously open – then over time developed new strategies for responding to 
protectionist pressures while still remaining (more or less71) within the boundaries 
imposed by the GATT/WTO, which in turn prompted further periodic revision of the 
rules in response to these broad reconfigurations of trade policy tools.72 From this 
perspective, mapping the effects of the GATT/WTO system is not just a question of the 
extent to which it has been effective in reducing trade barriers, but also a question of how 
it has helped to restructure and reorganize protectionist pressures. It is a system which, 
even as it has helped to exclude protectionist pressures from particular loci of trade 
 
70 H. Hughes and J. Waelbroeck, 'Can Developing Country Exports Keep Growing in the 1980s?' (1981) 9 
World Economy 127. 
71 The history of Voluntary Export Restraints tends to be understood on the contrary as an example of 
GATT Members acquiescing in a breach of the rules. 
72 The increased use of anti-dumping duties, and trade remedies more generally, over the last few decades, 
has been explained in this way: I.M. Destler, American trade politics (2005). 
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policy-making, has actually in practice facilitated the insertion of protectionist forces into 
others.73 The point of this is a general one: the story of the impacts of the GATT regime 
on the political economy of protectionism is much more complex and multi-layered than 
a typical analysis of the GATT texts would suggest. It raises the possibility – indeed the 
near certainty – that these impacts will look fundamentally different in different social 
and political contexts, and even have diametrically opposed results across different 
countries.  
 
A similarly complex and contradictory story can be sketched out in respect of the impact 
of the WTO system on democratic control of trade policy decisions. Because we focus on 
the direct and immediate impacts of WTO obligations, and think of them in terms of 
constraints and prohibitions on policy choices, it is customary to understand the WTO as 
reducing the democratic controls of national polities over the trade policies that their 
governments pursue. The line of cases in which the WTO dispute settlement system has 
purported to decide the permissibility under WTO law of particular national health- and 
environment-related regulatory measures has been the subject of a great deal of critique 
along these lines.74 Of course there is a degree of truth to this claim, but again it tells only 
part of the story. It is also true that this line of cases has – inadvertently and unpredictably 
– given rise to an unprecedented level of public scrutiny of WTO decisions, and has 
facilitated the engagement of a huge variety of social actors into trade policy debates. It is 
clear that, partly as a response to the perceived excesses of WTO law, the degree of 
public interest in, levels of information on, and general engagement with international 
economic issues, has significantly increased. Similarly, at a more specific level, the 
 
73 For example, there is a strong argument that the international trade regime has actually legitimated and 
perpetuated patterns of protectionism in the context of agricultural trade, in part by redirecting pressures in 
favour of liberalization, as well as building a consensus that agriculture was different from other sectors.  
74 The line of case to which I am referring, and which will be very familiar to readers include EC Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) – Complaint by the United States, WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998:I, 135, Panel Report, WT/DS26/R/USA, DSR 1998:III, 699, adopted 13 
February 1998; European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS135/AB/R, DSR 2000:VII, 3243; Panel Report, WT/DS135/R, DSR 
2000:VIII, 3305, adopted 5 April 2001; United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VII, 2755; Panel Report, WT/DS58/R, DSR 
1998:VII, 2821, adopted 6 November 1998; United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Panel Report, 
3 September 1991, unadopted, BISD 39S/155; Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation 
and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (‘Dominican Republic – Cigarettes’), Panel Report, WT/DS302/R, 
circulated 26 November 2004, among others.  
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reference in the SPS agreement to standards developed by some international standards-
setting bodies75 has given rise to critiques concerning the rising influence of relatively 
non-transparent and unaccountable international administrative bodies. But these very 
critiques have actually led to some institutional changes in these bodies, in the direction 
of greater democratization.76 This point is not a complex one, and has been made before 
in the context of studies of globalization77: it is simply that, like most processes 
associated with globalization, trade liberalization and institutions of trade governance 
tend to generate their own resistance, and their own counter-pressures. Whether these 
counterforces actually overpower those primary institutional influences, and the ways in 
which the two contradictory impulses interact, is in all cases an empirical question, the 
answer to which cannot be presumed, or determined in advance. 
 
A particular tendency of the legal centralist frame is to encourage to focus on the 
harmonizing or homogenizing impulse of the international trade regime. Put simply: to 
the extent that its Members are subject to the same constraints, and are forced to abide by 
the same rules, we might expect the trade regime to produce a degree of uniformity of 
trade policy choices across its membership. But once we pay closer attention to the 
indirect social effects of WTO rules, it becomes apparent that even uniform rules can be 
productive of diversity and variation.78 An interesting example is provided by the 
provisions of the SPS agreement mentioned above, which deal with the use of 
international standards and with the scientific basis for SPS measures. These provisions 
are typically understood as embedding a tendency towards regulatory harmonization into 
the agreement, as well as a tendency towards the reduction of regulatory diversity across 
Member states. To a large extent this is unsurprising: the presumption that SPS measures 
in conformity with international standards comply with the SPS agreement clearly 
 
75 See the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures, Article 3 (referring to 
Codex Alimentarius, the International Office of Epizootics, and the International Plant Protection 
Convention). 
76 See, for example, M. Echols, 'Institutional Cooperation and Norm Creation in International 
Organizations: The FAO-WHO Codex Alimentarius' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human 
Rights and International Trade (2005), 192 at 194 and surrounding. 
77 See, for example, D. Held and A.G. McGrew, The global transformations reader: an introduction to the 
globalization debate (2003). 
78 See L.L. Martin and B. Simmons, 'Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions', (1998) 
52(4) International Organization 729, 752. 
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encourages harmonization to some extent, while the science-based disciplines raise at 
least the possibility of regulatory convergence to the extent that scientific knowledge 
becomes more unified (on any particular question) over time. But, as Atik has 
perceptively noted, over the longer term, precisely the opposite is also perfectly 
plausible.79 Since the science on which SPS measures are based typically deals with 
questions of immense complexity, it can have a tendency towards variegation over time 
and in different contexts. This tendency may, Atik suggests, be reinforced by the SPS 
agreement itself, which by its operation encourages the multiplication of scientific 
agencies with input into the regulatory processes of WTO Members, and thus the 
multiplication of distinct scientific communities and scientific knowledges. This in turn 
can lead to greater regulatory diversity: 
 
As scientific activity is dispersed across a greater number of societies, a multiplicity of 
scientific views can be expected. More and more regulatory positions will be defensible 
by colourable claims of a scientific basis.80 
Of course, such indirect long-term effects are still speculative. The precise manner in 
which the SPS agreement interacts with and helps to reconstitute the geography of 
scientific knowledge is, again, an empirical question, even if it is one that is not amenable 
to easy measurement. It will depend, for example, on the extent to which the production 
of the relevant scientific knowledge remains centralized, and the precise mechanisms by 
which such knowledge is transmitted globally and reformulated in local contexts. The 
point is that it is not possible to say definitively in advance to what extent and in what 
circumstances the SPS agreement encourages regulatory convergence or regulatory 
diversity – and, more importantly, that studying the SPS text, and the decisions of the 
Appellate Body which deal with that text, can of necessity yield only a small and partial 
insight into that question. 
 
79 J. Atik, 'Science and International Regulatory Convergence', (1997) 17(2/3) Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business 736. 
80 Ibid., 750. 
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4. Sources and nature of WTO normativity 
 
This fourth and final criticism is that the legal centralist frame can give a misleading 
impression of the impact of the WTO because it focusses attention on the formal sources 
of WTO law – texts of the agreements and dispute settlement reports – to the exclusion of 
a wide variety of informal or semi-formal norms and norm-generating processes which 
also form part of the broader WTO legal system. Before the creation of the WTO in 1995, 
observers of the international trade regime were acutely aware that the formal texts of the 
GATT and related agreements provided only a partial window onto the normative system 
that the regime embodied. It was well understood that, despite their formally binding, 
‘hard’ legal status, the legal obligations imposed under these agreements were heavily 
mediated by shared social understandings and political consensuses among participants in 
the trading regime.81 Such understandings consisted of shared perceptions as to the 
intended meaning and coverage of these provisions, as well as tacit agreements 
designating certain disputed areas as off-limits (whatever the formal wording of the 
agreements).  
 
These perceptions have changed since the creation of the WTO. Primarily as a result of 
the creation of the new dispute settlement system, there seems now to be a general 
consensus that extra-legal and informal norms play a far less central role than they used 
to. There is a stronger sense that there ever was that it is sufficient to study formal WTO 
texts, and their associated jurisprudence, to discover the nature and extent of the WTO’s 
normative framework, and therefore its potential impact. In many ways this sense is 
justified: there is no doubt that important changes occurred at the transformation of the 
GATT into the more formal WTO system. But it is equally important not to overstate 
these transformations, and fall into an excessively formalist approach to the WTO legal 
system. In the same way as in any legal system, the texts of WTO law are embedded 
within a rich framework of social norms at play within the trading regime. These 
 
81 See generally J.H.H. Weiler, 'The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats-Reflections on the 
Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement', (2001) 35(2) Journal of World Trade 191. 
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informal norms interact with – modify, reconstitute, express and give meaning to – those 
formal rules in various complex ways, and at a variety of stages in their operation.82 
For one thing, they influence the kinds of social situations in which legal norms are 
typically operative. Take for example, the prohibition on discrimination in respect of 
domestic regulation, contained in GATT Article III and GATS Article XVII. While the 
formal scope of application of these provisions is very wide, in principle covering 
virtually the universe of internal regulatory measures which affect trade, in practice their 
operation has been considerably more limited. This is, in part, because of the existence of 
a variety of informal norms and tacit understandings which tell us what sorts of 
regulation can properly be thought of as an impediment to trade, and what sorts simply 
have nothing to do with trade. Of course, these informal norms are not always well-
defined, and certainly vary over time. Before the 1980s, for example, internal regulations 
of any sort were rarely the subject of trade dispute. Since then, however, particular 
regulatory fields have come to be perceived as potential sources of trade barriers, and as 
legitimate targets of trade disputes: health and safety regulation, consumer protection 
regulation, and industrial policy are examples. Other fields – such as public interest 
regulation of essential service suppliers, affirmative action policies in respect of 
marginalized groups, social labelling schemes, or even renewable energy policy83 – are 
arguably in the early stages of the same process. It is important to make clear that here I 
am not referring to the changes to the formal scope of application of WTO disciplines on 
domestic regulation. Rather, I am referring the evolution of the broader social and 
normative framework regulating which domestic regulatory interventions typically come 
to the attention of trade policy-makers, and, conversely, and determining whether private 
traders tend to think of trade law as a possible remedy when they are confronted by 
particular regulatory difficulties. 
 
82 M. Finnemore and S.J. Toope, 'Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer Views of Law and Politics', (2001) 
55(3) International Organization 743. 
83 For some attention to some of these these issues in terms of their character as potential trade barriers, and 
their WTO consistency, see for example OHCHR, ‘An analytical study on the fundamental principle of 
non-discrimination in the context of globalization’, E/CN.4/2004/40, 15 January 2004; and the repport by 
the Renewable Energy and International Law Project (REIL) entitled “World Trade and Renewable 
Energy: The Case of Non-Tariff Measures”, May 5 2005, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/envirocenter/renewableenergy/REIL_WTO_paper.pdf.
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Similarly, informal or tacit normative understandings regulate which disputes are 
ultimately brought before the WTO dispute resolution machinery. A decision whether or 
not to bring WTO proceedings is not just a matter of strategic calculation, it is also partly 
determined by social norms – particularly norms which tell participations the kinds of 
situations which the provisions were originally intended to cover, the purposes dispute 
settlement can legitimately be used for, and the kinds of questions dispute settlement 
bodies are capable of answering. Again, the non-discrimination norms can be used as an 
example, and in particular the application of those norms to sub-federal measures. There 
is a genuine question whether differential treatment across state jurisdictions within a 
federal state can in some circumstances constitute discriminatory treatment under GATS 
Articles II and XVII: authority on the question is thin, but some comments within both 
GATT and WTO jurisprudence seem to suggest that cross-jurisdictional differential 
treatment may constitute discrimination.84 Discussions on the question in the context of 
the Negotiating Group on Services revealed a widespread consensus that (whatever the 
precise wording of the GATS) the non-discrimination norm was never intended to catch 
differential treatment of this sort, though Members could not agree on an appropriate way 
forward on the issue.85 Documents from those meetings evidence an informal agreement 
that dispute settlement proceedings will not be brought in respect of such matters – an 
understanding which appears to have been relatively effective in the period since.86 Few 
 
84 See GATT Document, Negotiating Group on Services, Chairman’s Statement: Informal GNS Meeting – 
10 December 1993, MTN.GNS/49, 11 December 1993; GATT Document, Preparatory Committee for 
World Trade Organization, Sub-Committee on Services, Subsidies and Taxes at the Sub-Federal Level: 
Communication from the United States, PC/SCS/W/4, 30 June 1994, at para A.1; WTO Document, 
Preparatory Committee for the World Trade Organization, Sub-Committee on Services, Report of the 
Meeting Held on 16 December 1994: Note by the Secretariat, PC/SCS/M/6, 22 February 1995; WTO 
Document, Council for Trade in Services, Interim Report on the Status of Consultations on Taxes and 
Subsidies at the Sub-Central Level, S/C/W/13, 30 January 1996.  The United States believed it necessary to 
inscribe a wide variety of sub-federal taxes as limitations to Article II and XVII in its GATS Schedule of 
Commitments, on the grounds that state tax authorities would otherwise be required to provide foreign 
service suppliers with the most favourable treatment to be found in any other state. See also United States – 
Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, Panel Report, adopted 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/206 for 
an example which some offer of when differences across different jurisdictions gave rise to a finding of 
discrimination. 
85 Ibid. 
86 See GATT Document, Negotiating Group on Services, Chairman’s Statement: Informal GNS Meeting – 
10 December 1993, MTN.GNS/49. 11 December 1993, under Heading 4: “I wish to re-emphasise, perhaps 
more strongly than in my earlier statement, that pending further clarification of this and other questions 
relating to the scope of the Agreement, that it is assumed that participants would refrain from taking issues 
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examples will be so explicit and easily identified: most often understandings about what 
kinds of measures may legitimately be the subject of dispute settlement are by nature 
tacit, submerged, fluid and often underspecified. Nevertheless, they can be powerful, and 
to implicitly exclude them from our definition of trade law inevitably on occasion leads 
to an incomplete and sometimes skewed portrait of the content and effects of WTO legal 
constraints. 
 
*
Taken together, these four critiques add up to the core claim that the trade and human 
rights literature – like most literature on the trade regime generally – has so far proceeded 
on the basis of a partial and somewhat misleading picture of the impact of the trade 
regime on the enjoyment of human rights. But why does this matter? It matters because 
our knowledge of the impacts of the trade regime fundamentally shapes our reformative 
efforts: it helps us to determine which are the most important issues to address (and 
which are not), it informs our ideas of what kind of change is possible and desirable (and 
those kinds that are not), and it deeply structures the way we imagine the range of 
potential futures for the trade regime. In the trade and human rights debate, the legal 
centralist framework within which it operates has tended to generate a reformative 
agenda focussed predominantly on changes to the formal legal rules contained in WTO 
agreements, and to the processes by which these rules are generated, interpreted, and 
applied.87 Sometimes, this may mean imposing stricter liberalization commitments: 
stronger disciplines on domestic agricultural subsidy programs, rules ensuring enhanced 
market access for developing country exports, and so on. More often, however, it takes 
the form of advocacy for a relaxation the constraints imposed by trade law, on the basis 
that the policies required (or prohibited) by trade law can undermine (or enhance) the 
enjoyment of human rights. It is notable that human rights language has most often and 
 
arising in this area to dispute settlement but would try to settle them through bilateral consultations.  
However, participants must assume their own responsibilities in deciding whether any measures of this sort 
which they maintain should be scheduled or made the subject of MFN exemptions - though in this respect 
also it is hoped that restraint will be shown.” 
87 Often, in fact, this is coupled with a claim that incorporating human rights into these processes in some 
sense will contribute to that agenda. I explore the claim that human rights have something to offer trade 
policy-making processes in Part 3 below.  
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most forcefully been deployed to advance the concept of ‘policy space’.88 For example, 
human rights considerations have been advanced to argue in favour of: new general 
exceptions to GATT disciplines; less restrictive interpretations of GATT non-
discrimination obligations; an exemption from certain AoA obligations in respect of 
development measures; increased flexibilities for developing countries in respect of both 
the level and timing of liberalization commitments; interpretations of the SPS agreement 
which allow greater scope for precautionary regulation, among many others.89 The 
influence of legal centralism here is clear: since the WTO is conceptualized as a 
constraint on behaviour, remedial proposals tend to focus on removing those constraints, 
and creating greater ‘policy autonomy’. 
 
My main concern with agenda is what it does not do. I explained above how the trade 
regime does much more than simply act as a constraint on state behaviour, and is much 
more than simply a set of binding legal obligations. It is an environment in which, among 
many other things, the liberal trade project is constituted and given meaning, in which 
states are taught what it means to be a liberal trading nation, in which norms of legitimate 
and appropriate trade policy are generated and disseminating, and in which authorized 
knowledge about the trading system and how it operates is generated and deployed by 
 
88 For clarity, the notion of ‘policy space’ refers to at least three distinct claims: that WTO Members should 
not be required to put in place liberalizing policies where such policies have a negative impact on the 
enjoyment of human rights; that Members should not be prohibited from pursuing policy options which 
have (or could have) a beneficial impact on the enjoyment of human rights; and that individuals and 
communities should as far as possible be free to choose their own goals and make their own choices 
without undue external constraint or impediment. 
89 The work of the High Commissioner, for example, has strongly emphasized the need for further 
‘flexibility’ in WTO agreements, as well as the need to use existing flexibilities: see, ‘The impact of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on human rights’, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, 27 June 2001, at para 28; ‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of 
human rights’, E/CN.4/2002/54, 15 January 2002, at paras 34, 48, 53; ‘Liberalization of trade in services 
and human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002, at paras 51-67. See also generally CIEL, Going 
with the Flow: How International Trade, Finance and Investment Regimes Affect the Provision of Water to 
the Poor, Center for International Environmental Law (2003); M. Krajewski, National regulation and trade 
liberalization in services: the legal impact of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on 
national regulatory autonomy (2003); T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn, 'Linking Trade Regulation and 
Human Rights in International Law: An Overview' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human 
Rights and International Trade (2005), 1 at 23 (“[t]rade regulation should be shaped in a manner that 
permits Members of the WTO to pursue appropriate domestic human rights policies …”); C. Dommen, 
'Human Rights and Trade: Two Practical Suggestions for Promoting Coordination and Coherence' in T. 
Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 199 at 200; K. 
Gallagher, Putting development first: the importance of policy space in the WTO and IFIs (2005). 
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states in the formulation of their interests. Far from simply permitting or prohibiting 
specific trade policies, it helps to constitute the fundamental ideational and political 
context in which trade policies are imagined and implemented – and which in many 
respects determines their ultimate effects. The point is that an agenda which focusses on 
modifying the obligations imposed in WTO agreements simply does not engage with 
these broader processes, and has little to say to them. More than that, it tends to divert 
attention away from these processes, and make them less visible. By equating the absence 
of overt legal disciplines on states’ policy choices with ‘policy autonomy’, the trade and 
human rights literature encourages us to see the preferences and choices of WTO 
Members as pre-existing their interaction with the WTO, and as a given part of the 
landscape in which the international trade regime operates. 
 
This is problematic from two perspectives. First, there is I believe an urgent need for the 
critical energies of human rights (and other) commentators to be directed toward these 
more diffuse mechanisms by which the trade regime determines the nature and effects of 
the present international trading system. It is important to understand the precise 
processes by which these mechanisms work, and to build a picture of their impacts, in 
order to appreciate in what ways they are (and are not) complicit in producing some of 
the less beneficial aspects and outcomes of the international trading system. This would 
then enable engagement with, and transformation of, those processes as appropriate. If I 
am right, and these more diffuse mechanisms are in the long run more significant 
determinants of the character of the international trading system than the specific 
obligations imposed in WTO agreements, then failure to critically engage with them 
means that the trade and human rights debate is to a significant extent simply missing the 
point. Second, attending to the variety of modes of influence that the WTO yields can 
help us to imagine productive ways in which the trade regime can be involved in the 
pursuit of a range of desirable social projects – such as development, or the protection of 
human rights, and so on. When we think of the WTO as essentially a set of constraining 
rules, then the kinds of things it can offer these projects is relatively limited. Primarily, 
the task is to ensure that it does not interfere with their pursuit. But once we realise that, 
for example, the WTO plays a teaching function, the possibility is raised that it might be 
41
harnessed as a site of policy learning, a venue for the production and exchange of 
innovative policy knowledge.90 Similarly, once we realise that it also plays a normative 
role – disseminating ideas of legitimate and desirable trade policy, and constructing the 
values and purposes associated with the liberal trade project – then it becomes clear that 
the WTO could function as a valuable space for the deliberative and discursive renewal 
of the liberal trade project, and provide tools and a venue for the collective re-imagining 
of that project. And finally, if it is true that the WTO acts in part to mobilize particular 
constituencies and facilitate their insertion into trade policy-making processes, then it 
might be fruitful to ask how these spaces and mobilizing forces might be exploited to 
generate yet broader and more active public participation in respect of trade policy 
questions.91 
But if my main concern is what the present trade and human rights literature fails to 
address, there is also a real question whether its present reformative agenda is likely or 
able to achieve the kind of transformative change which it promises. For one thing, we 
learnt above that modifications to the rules of the GATT/WTO system can often have 
surprising and complex social effects, which vary significantly from context to context 
both in their nature and their strength, and which at times run directly counter those 
which are intended. This suggests that agenda for change should be formulated not so 
much in terms of changes to particular rules – new exceptions for developing countries, 
alternative interpretive choices in the Article XX jurisprudence, greater AMS reduction 
commitments, and so on – but rather in terms of the social outcomes which those changes 
are intended to produce. It also suggests the need for constant monitoring of the extent to 
which they do in fact produce those outcomes – and for flexibility, critical reflection and 
revision where they do not, or where they produce additional unintended and undesirable 
effects. This runs counter to the implicit tendency in the current debate to spend far more 
time discussing and debating the merits of particular rules on the basis of their intended 
 
90 On the potential of the WTO as a site of learning, see, eg B. Hoekman, 'Operationalizing the Concept of 
Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment', (2005) 8 Journal of International 
Economic Law 405; Cooney and Lang, “Taking uncertainty seriously: Adaptive governance, alien invasive 
species and the WTO” (forthcoming). 
91 This last possibility, it should be noted, is to some extent already happening within the broader literature 
connecting the WTO with principles of democratic governance. 
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or apparent effects, and far less attention to the socio-legal questions of how particular 
changes to the rules play themselves out over time in different contexts.  
 
We also learnt above that GATT/WTO legal disciplines, while clearly important, are not 
as important or salient a factor in regulatory decision-making as is often assumed. Is it 
reasonable, then, to pursue a strategy of achieving transformative change to the trading 
order primarily through a modification of WTO rules? Current efforts to achieve dramatic 
increases in market access for developing country goods through the negotiation of 
significantly stricter legal commitments on the part of the industrialized world seem 
based on an overestimation of the centrality of international legal obligations in the 
formulation of trade policy, as well as a misreading of the way the GATT/WTO system 
has operated over its history. There is a strong case to be made that the success of that 
system in presiding over a dramatic period of liberalization owes much more to its ability 
to generate and sustain among policy elites a shared normative commitment in favour of 
liberalization, and to teach them to think about the trading system in ways which make 
liberalization appear rational and desirable to them. Similarly, much advocacy in favour 
of greater ‘policy flexibility’ under WTO law seems equally to be based on an 
overestimation of the central role that WTO law plays in directing and constraining 
policy-making. As argued above, the reality is that WTO law is often only one relatively 
minor constraint in a sea of pressures facing regulators, and most domestic regulation of 
direct concern to human rights advocates is determined only at the margin by WTO legal 
constraints. Policy-makers in developing countries, for example, are subject to acute 
constraints emanating from other international organizations, from the demands of capital 
markets, bilaterally from trading partners, from local industry groups, and so on.92 There 
is therefore no guarantee that, were Members’ to be accorded greater flexibility under 
WTO law, they would necessarily be either willing or able to exploit it. (Indeed, it is 
interesting to note to date no country has exploited the system put in place by the Doha 
 
92 The point I make here, about the existence of multiple and interrelated causes, is related to a point made 
by other commentators that the human rights movement tends to focus on the responsibility of individual 
actors (or organizations), with the result that it is less able to recognise and adequately address structural 
causes of injustice and poverty: eg, T. Evans and J. Hancock, 'Doing Something Without Doing Anything: 
International Human Rights Law and the Challenge of Globalisation', (1998) 2 International Journal of 
Human Rights 1. 
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accord.93) Arguably, therefore, there might be more productive directions for the energy 
of the human rights movement than ensuring sufficient regulatory ‘autonomy’ from the 
strictures of trade law.94 
It is important not to overstate my case. My claim is emphatically not that the present 
reformative agenda which has arisen out of the trade and human rights debate is 
necessarily ineffective, nor that changes to WTO obligations are unimportant. Rather, I 
am arguing for a more realistic assessment of their importance, and therefore a more open 
and explicit consideration of what is the most important use of critical energies. I am 
suggesting that a much more fine-grained analysis is needed of the trade-offs implicit in 
advocating for legal change at the WTO. What are the opportunity costs of pursuing an 
agenda of legal change to (say) TRIPs Article 31(f)? What is not on the WTO agenda 
because this issue is? How much political capital is being spent which could have been 
spent on other issues? What issues and venues escape notice because our attention is 
focussed on the WTO? In part because of the legal centralist frame within which the 
debate is carried out, many human rights critiques of the WTO too often simply assume 
the central importance of WTO law on the relevant issues. They too rarely include a 
detailed and explicit comparison of the most pressing needs facing WTO Members in 
particular areas of concern to human rights actors, and an evaluation of the best allocation 
of scarce political, institutional, financial and advocacy resources. A more accurate and 
fine-grained representation of the varied impacts of the trade regime would help to make 
the arguments of human rights advocates more responsive to the realities of decision-
making practices on the ground. 
 
93 That is to say, there have no formal notifications as of August 2006, though there have been suggestions 
of an increase in the use of compulsory licenses other than through this mechanism, see for example, 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twninfohealth004.htm.
94 It may be argued, that, far from taking energy and resources away from other issues, major public 
campaigns critical of the WTO have in fact energized support for related initiatives. Matthews, for 
example, has argued that probably the most important role of the TRIPs and public health campaign was its 
role in raising the profile of the issue of particular epidemics in developing countries, and thus generating a 
momentum for other (non-WTO) mechanisms to address them: D. Matthews, 'WTO Decision on 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health: a 
Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?' (2004) 7(1) Journal of International Economic 
Law 73. 
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3.  LEAVE IT TO THE EXPERTS? UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
TRADE POLICY DEBATES 
At this point in my argument, I want to shift the focus from the trade regime to the human 
rights movement. If one of the core claims of the trade and human rights literature is that 
the trading system can have negative effects on the enjoyment of human rights, the other 
is that human rights can in some sense help to produce a better trading system. 
“Achieving fair and equitable trade liberalization by adopting human rights approaches to 
WTO rules”, the UN Human Rights Commissioner has argued, “will be an important step 
in establishing a just international and social order”.95 In this section I interrogate this 
notion of a ‘human rights approach’ to trade liberalization. What role can the human 
rights movement play in re-making the trading system? What precisely do human rights 
have to offer trade policy debates?96 My aim is not to analyse and evaluate competing 
proposals for reform of the WTO, nor to argue for or against particular trade policy 
changes. Rather, it is to reflect, and to encourage further reflection, on what role – if any 
– human rights actors and institutions can constructively play in debates about these 
questions. 
 
There is one point I should make about the perspective from which I approach this task. I 
am most interested in what human rights have to offer at the level of ideas and knowledge 
about what kind of trade policy is desirable and legitimate. My starting point for thinking 
about this more specific issue is to draw a distinction between two different sets of ideas. 
 
95 OHCHR, ‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights’, E/CN.4/2002/54, 15 
January 2002; at para 9. See also, C. Dommen, 'Human Rights and Trade: Two Practical Suggestions for 
Promoting Coordination and Coherence' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and 
International Trade (2005), 199 at 198, suggesting that collaboration between trade and human rights 
professionals “can really contribute to ensuring that trade rules are developed and applied in ways that 
promote an equitable economy”.  
96 A somewhat similar set of questions has been asked in relation to human rights and development. For an 
excellent critical discussion, see Alston, “A Human Rights Perspective on the Millennium Development 
Goals”, Paper presented as a contribution to the work of the Millennium Project Task Force on Poverty and 
Economic Development, and references cited therein. See also ‘Study on policies for development in a 
globalizing world: what can the human rights approach contribute?’, Note by the Secretariat, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/18, 7 June 2004. 
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The first set are made up of ‘primary’ ideas about what trade policy ought to be, and what 
the trading system ought to look like. Such ideas are obviously continually evolving, and 
subject to contestation, but at any point in time there is an identifiable set of beliefs which 
can be characterised as orthodox, and which is widely shared among policy elites. These 
ideas themselves are founded upon a body of technical knowledge of the causal dynamics 
of the trading system, and what the effects of particular trade policy interventions are 
likely to be. The second set of ideas consists of ‘secondary’ ideas about how ‘primary’ 
ideas ought to be produced – a set of beliefs about how societies ought properly to go 
about finding solutions to the problems thrown up by international trade. In trade policy 
as in many other policy areas, these beliefs are currently shaped by a normative 
framework of technical rationality. They include the beliefs that international trade forms 
a relatively independent policy domain, and that questions arising in this domain ought to 
be decided by trained experts deploying socially sanctioned forms of rational knowledge. 
They also include a set of ideas about who counts as an expert, how experts act, and what 
counts as relevant knowledge for these experts to use. The result of these secondary 
norms is that the production and evaluation of ideas and knowledge about what trade 
policy ought to be tends to involve particular kinds of people, particular kinds of 
vocabularies and arguments, and particular kinds of cognitive and conceptual 
frameworks. 
 
These observations are hardly new97, but they have a twofold significance in the trade 
and human rights debate. On the one hand, they suggest that the human rights movement 
must engage at the level of ideas and knowledge if it is to fulfil its promise of helping to 
re-make the international economic order. Whatever else shapes trade policy, it is clear 
that prevailing technical ideas about what kind of trade policy is rational and desirable 
deeply influence the shape of the international trading system.98 Without some change in 
 
97 For an excellent treatment of international organizations as ‘bureaucracies’, drawing on a long Weberian 
tradition of research into rational bureaucratic governance structures, see M.N. Barnett and M. Finnemore, 
'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', (1999) 53(4) International 
Organization 699; M.N. Barnett and M. Finnemore, Rules for the world: international organizations in 
global politics (2004). 
98 On the role of ‘ideas’ in the formulation of trade policy, see generally J. Goldstein, 'Ideas, institutions, 
and American trade policy', (1988) 42(1) International Organization 179; J. Goldstein, Ideas, interests, and 
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these ideas, a genuine transformation of the international trading order is considerably 
less likely. On the other hand, this same commitment to technical rationality makes it 
more difficult for human rights actors to engage substantively in trade policy debates, and 
therefore to influence the evolution of policy knowledge. After all, human rights actors – 
at least in their capacity as human rights actors – are not trade policy experts. What, then, 
can they tell us about what trade policy ought to be which those experts do not already 
know? It is not just a question of expertise, but also a linguistic question. The technical 
idiom of technical trade policy debates tends to exclude from the start the kind of ‘values 
talk’ characteristic of human rights language. It is a presupposition of such debates that 
the kinds of questions that they deal with are not amenable to resolution through moral 
language – by definition, they call for the application of technical expertise. Furthermore, 
as is commonly observed, it is fundamental to experts’ identity and ongoing legitimacy 
that they present themselves as apolitical, in the sense of rationally implementing a social 
goals defined elsewhere.99 Values talk does not easily fit within that culture. As will 
become clear below, my thinking about the role of the human rights movement in 
producing a new international trade order is deeply informed by both prongs of this 
dilemma – the crucial need to engage in the domain of trade policy knowledge, and the 
considerable obstacles to doing so. 
 
Under the first three headings which follow, I set out and interrogate what I see as the 
three most common conceptions of what ‘human rights’ bring to trade policy debates.100 
American trade policy (1993); J. Goldstein and R.O. Keohane, Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, 
institutions, and political change (1993). 
99 See, for example, M.N. Barnett and M. Finnemore, Rules for the world: international organizations in 
global politics (2004). 
100 Because of the way that I have framed this dilemma, there is at least one model which I do not address 
in this paper. This model see human rights protection – conceived in traditional terms as the protection of 
freedom of expression and other democratic freedoms, some guarantees of distributive justice, and so on – 
as in many respects complementary to, and supportive of, well-functioning markets and international trade. 
To simplify: human rights law, in this model, provides a set of ‘flanking policies’ which ought to 
accompany trade liberalization, in order to ensure that trade liberalization brings its promised benefits. See 
generally, T. Cottier, 'Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover', (2002) 5(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 111; T. Cottier and S. Khorana, 'Linkages between Freedom of Expression 
and Unfair Competition Rules in International Trade: The Hertel Case and Beyond' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi 
and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 245, as well as the work of 
Petersmann, eg, E.U. Petersmann, 'The WTO Constitution and Human Rights', (2000) 3(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 19; E.U. Petersmann, 'Human Rights and International Economic Law in the 
21st Century: The Need to Clarify their Interrelationships', (2001) 4 Journal of International Economic 
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Some argue that the trade and human rights debate is essentially one about coherence 
between international regimes, and that therefore it makes no sense to ask ‘what human 
rights bring’ to the debate. I suggest that this framework obscures more than it reveals, 
and explain how it actually helps to undermine the transformative power of the human 
rights movement. Others suggest that human rights provides a set of substantive values 
and rules which can guide trade policy choices. I argue, on the contrary, that this is 
illusory, and represents an oversimplified account of how human rights language and 
advocacy works. And yet others claim that, even if human rights cannot define on their 
own what trade policy ought to be, they do provide a variety of potentially effective 
political tools for achieving desirable trade policy outcomes. While I substantially agree 
with this claim as far as it goes, I question whether – if this is all that human rights do – 
the human rights movement can ever instigate genuinely transformative change. Under 
the fourth and fifth headings, I offer two more ways to conceptualize the role of human 
rights in trade policy debates. In keeping with my interest in the production of trade 
policy knowledge, I argue first of all that the human rights movement can help to provide 
a trigger for policy learning – it can help, in other words, to facilitate and enable the 
production of new ideas about desirable trade policy. Second, I suggest that the human 
rights movement may be helping to transform the ‘secondary’ beliefs I referred to above 
– beliefs about how trade policy ideas ought to be generated and evaluated, and by 
whom. In some ways, these two conceptions are simply explicit theories describing what 
 
Law 3; E.U. Petersmann, 'Time for a United Nations 'Global Compact' for Integrating Human Rights into 
the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration', (2002) 13(3) European Journal 
of International Law 621; E.U. Petersmann, 'Taking Human Dignity, Poverty and Empowerment of 
Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston', (2002) 13(4) European Journal of International Law 
845; E.U. Petersmann, 'Human Rights and the Law of the World Trade Organization', (2003) 37(2) Journal 
of World Trade 241; E.U. Petersmann, 'The 'Human Rights Approach' Advocated by the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and by the International Labour Organization', (2004) 7(3) Journal of 
International Economic Law 605; E.U. Petersmann, 'Human Rights and International Trade Law: Defining 
and Connecting the Two Fields' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and 
International Trade (2005), 29. Furthermore, I do not address (increasingly rare) arguments that the WTO 
system can be used ‘positively’ to enforce human rights norms, as in the debates on human rights 
conditionality. On the distinction between the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ aspects of the trade and human 
rights debate see E.U. Petersmann, 'Time for a United Nations 'Global Compact' for Integrating Human 
Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration', (2002) 13(3) 
European Journal of International Law 621; M. Green, 'Integrating Enforcement of Human Rights Laws 
with Enforcement of Trade Laws: Some Baseline Issues' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), 
Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 236 at 237; J. Pauwelyn, 'Human Rights in WTO Dispute 
Settlement' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 
205 at 206. 
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human rights actors are already doing. But they are also more than that, to the extent that 
clearer understandings of what it is that human rights actors can and do offer can lead to 
more targeted and more productive interventions into trade policy debates. 
 
1.  Fragmentation and coherence 
 
For many commentators, the trade and human rights debate is fundamentally concerned 
with balancing competing social values. As desirable and legitimate as the liberal trade 
project is, many argue, it is still only one among a huge variety of social projects which 
states and their populations value. Alternative values – such as consumer protection, 
economic stability, environmental protection, and so on – at times need to be balanced 
against the demands of trade liberalization. At the national level, complex institutional, 
legal and political mechanisms typically exist to resolve such policy trade-offs. But (so 
this argument runs) no such mechanisms exist at the international level: international 
political and institutional life is characterized primarily by fragmentation, by a relative 
absence of mechanisms of coordination, collaboration and coherence across policy fields. 
The crucial task, therefore, is to design precisely those kinds of mechanisms, “in an 
attempt to provide greater coherence to international … policy-making and a more 
balanced international and social order”.101 This is particularly true for the trade regime: 
“[t]he relationship between trade values … and other values”, writes Trachtman, “is a 
critical challenge [for] the WTO.”102 
Within what I will call the ‘coherence framework’, these normative conflicts between 
‘trade values’ and ‘other values’ also have an institutional and legal dimension. Different 
categories of social preferences or values tend to be associated with different institutions: 
the WTO with a preference for trade liberalization (or the benefits that trade liberalization 
 
101 OHCHR, ‘Liberalization of trade in services and human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002, at 
para 4 
102 J.P. Trachtman, 'The Constitutions of the WTO', (2006) 17(3) European Journal of International Law 
623, 634. For works which illustrate this coherence framework in a clear and sophisticated manner, see, for 
example: T. Cottier, 'Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover', (2002) 5(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 111, the chapters by Mosoti, Breining-Kaufman, Dommen and Ranjan in T. 
Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), and OHCHR, 
‘Liberalization of trade in services and human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002, at para 4. 
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is thought to provide, however they are conceptualized); the ILO with the value of labour 
rights protection; environmental organizations with the value of environmental 
protection; and so on. Because institutions are seen in this way in functional terms – as 
created by way of response to a particular subset of social demands103 – problems of 
normative coherence come to be seen as closely related to patterns of institutional 
isolation and collaboration. Similarly, as each international regime is associated with a 
particular sub-field of international law – international trade law; international 
environmental law; or international human rights law – formal conflicts between the rules 
of these different sub-fields of international law are understood as the “legal face” of the 
underlying normative conflicts described in the previous paragraph.104 
How are human rights said to fit into this framework? It is useful to distinguish between 
two different claims, which might be termed the ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ claim respectively. 
The strong claim is that human rights provide a normative framework within which to 
resolve value trade-offs.105 Human rights, in other words, can help us to solve the 
problems thrown up by fragmentation in a legitimate and appropriate way. Different 
commentators have forwarded different reasons for why the language of human rights is 
particularly well-suited to the task of balancing of competing social values. First, and 
most obviously, human rights themselves can be understood as representing a set of 
values which ought to be given special weight in resolving value trade-offs. Arguably, 
the entire human rights edifice can be thought of as an attempt to define and categorize 
those values which are regarded as particularly fundamental, and as commanding special 
moral force and legitimacy. Second, human rights bodies have considerable experience 
with the task of balancing competing social values in particular contexts. As a result, 
 
103 For a seminal account of functionalism as it relates to various theoretical traditions on the role of 
institutions in political life, see P.A. Hall and R.C.R. Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms', (1996) 44(5) Political Studies 936. 
104 J.P. Trachtman, 'The Constitutions of the WTO', (2006) 17(3) European Journal of International Law 
623, 635. 
105 Petersmann is a strong proponent of this kind of claim: see, for example, E.U. Petersmann, 'Time for a 
United Nations 'Global Compact' for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: 
Lessons from European Integration', (2002) 13(3) European Journal of International Law 621. See also C. 
Dommen, 'Human Rights and Trade: Two Practical Suggestions for Promoting Coordination and 
Coherence' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 
199 at 202. 
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human rights law and discourse contain a wide variety of tools and mechanisms with 
which policy-makers and judicial bodies are familiar, which have proven to be 
operationally robust in a variety of different contexts.106 Third, it is said that human rights 
is a sufficiently open discourse that many different kinds of values or social demands can 
be expressed within it. The ‘sensibility’ of human rights, that is to say, is peculiarly 
sensitive to a variety of competing social demands. Furthermore, within human rights 
discourse, different values (as ‘interdependent and indivisible’ rights) begin from a 
position of presumptively equal strength. Human rights therefore may offer a language 
which is less susceptible to claims of systematic bias than other languages. This claim, it 
should be noted, is typically made in the context of an analogous critique: that decisions 
involving trade-offs should not be left to the trade regime, as it is more likely to exhibit a 
systemic bias in favour of ‘trade values’, and to be less responsive to the full breadth of 
social demands.107 
How attractive is this as a way of thinking about what human rights offers trade policy 
debates? In my view, it is vulnerable to a number of compelling criticisms. For one thing, 
trade-off questions raise vitally important and highly contested political issues, of the 
kind that can never finally be resolved. It is therefore misleading to talk as if they can be 
conclusively settled simply by reference to set of human rights norms, as if the relative 
priority to be accorded to new and evolving international projects has already been 
 
106 Judicial interpretations in human rights law of such concepts as necessity, proportionality, legitimate 
pubic purpose, and non-discrimination are all of obvious utility in helping the system of trade law – which 
after all is the younger partner in the relationship – in its development of similar concepts and tools. 
107 S. Cho, 'Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving beyond the Entropic Dilemma', (2005) 5 
Chicago Journal of International Law 625, 640 (“pro-trade bias”); M.C.E.J. Bronckers, 'More Power to the 
WTO?' (2001) 4 Journal of International Economic Law 41, 46 (“liberal trade bias”), G.C. Shaffer, 'The 
World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment 
of Trade and Environment Matters', (2001) 25(1) Harvard Environmental Law Review 1, 12, (“neoliberal 
bias”), G. Shaffer, 'WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics on Trade-Labor, Trade-
Environment Linkages for the WTO's Future', (2000) 24(1/2) Fordham International Law Journal 608, 611 
(“closed, trade-biased … institution”), J.H. Knox, 'The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and 
the Environment', (2004) 28(1) Harvard Environmental Law Review 1, 1 (“biased”), A.T. Guzman, 'Global 
Governance and the WTO', (2004) 45(2) Harvard International Law Journal 303, 306 (“trade bias”), L.A. 
DiMatteo, et al., 'The Doha Declaration and Beyond: Giving a Voice to Non-Trade Concerns Within the 
WTO Trade Regime', (2003) 36(1) Vanderbilt Journal Of Transnational Law 95, 133 (“free trade bias”), 
H.L. Schloemann and S. Ohlhoff, '"Constitutionalization" and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National 
Security as an Issue of Competence', (1999) 93(2) American Journal of International Law 424, 451 
(“protrade bias”). 
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determined in advance. Too often, this ‘strong’ claim seems to be deployed to close off 
debate about normative conflicts, rather than open it. Second, it is not self-evident that 
social projects and values which are expressed in rights terms need necessarily be given 
more weight than those which cannot.108 It is important to remember that what constitutes 
a ‘human rights violation’ or ‘human rights issue’ at any particular point in time is in part 
socially and politically constructed, and that the processes by which particular injustices 
are produced as human rights issues are inevitably selective and partly arbitrary. Who 
decides which social projects are expressive of human rights values, and which are not? 
And why, indeed, should we accord less priority to those deeply held values which, for 
one reason or another, cannot or have not been expressed in the language of human 
rights? Third, there is the question of institutional competence. The claim that normative 
conflicts ought to be resolved by recourse to human rights principles does not necessarily 
imply the further claim that human rights institutions ought themselves to play a central 
role in the resolution of such conflicts. Nevertheless, that is a likely outcome of taking 
seriously the use of human rights in this way. It is not at all clear, however, that 
international human rights bodies as presently constituted are up to this task. At the very 
least, there is a need to make a stronger case that these institutions are well-placed – or at 
least are better suited than imaginable alternatives, including a reformed trade regime. 
Fourth and finally, although it is claimed that the use of a human rights framework can 
help to resolve trade-off questions, often the result is simply to defer or displace these 
questions. For example, even if we agree that social values expressed as human rights 
should be accorded a degree of priority, a question remains as to which values can and 
should in fact be expressed in human rights terms. Petersmann, for example, sees trade-
offs between trade liberalization and (say) the protection of vulnerable minorities as 
involving a balancing of competing rights.109 Others strongly disagree.110 While some 
contestation of the language of human rights is to be expected, and we should not too 
hastily conclude that human rights language is indeterminate, we do well to remember 
 
108 Howse makes a similar point: R. Howse, 'Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? 
Comment on Petersmann', (2002) 13(3) European Journal of International Law 651. 
109 See references in n100 above. 
110 For example, P. Alston, 'Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply 
to Petersmann', (2002) 13(4) European Journal of International Law 815. 
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that the content and meaning of human rights language is itself strongly contested, and 
may not always provide the substantial guidance that it promises. 
 
Let me turn then to the ‘weak’ claim. This argument is that the protection of human rights 
is one normative project among the many needing to be balanced against the demands of 
trade liberalization. Greater coherence in international policy-making, on this view, 
means striking a better balance between the demands of trade liberalization and the 
protection of human rights. Different commentators have different views on what an 
appropriate balance is. Some suggest that human rights ought usually to take priority, 
others note simply that it is “difficult to say which in the abstract should prevail as a 
matter of principle”.111 Observe that within this framework, it makes little sense to ask 
what human rights offer trade policy debates. Since the problem to be addressed is 
precisely the potential for conflict between the trade and human rights regimes – or the 
values they are taken to represent – the relevance of human rights language is assumed 
from the beginning. To the extent that the language of human rights has a role to play, it 
is simply to ensure that the goal of protecting human rights is given due weight in 
decisions affecting that goal. As noted above, it ought to be remembered that the debate 
about coherence takes place against the background of a concern that – because of the 
institutional strength of the WTO – ‘trade values’ tend in practice to be given priority 
over other values at the international level. The virtue of human rights, on this view, is 
that it provides a powerful institutional voice in which to articulate alternative social 
demands on the international level. Human rights, that is to say, can help to correct the 
perceived imbalance in the international system, according to which the liberal trade 
project tends in practice to undermine or override other legitimate social projects.112 
This vision of how and why human rights are relevant in trade policy debates has roved 
very influential. As a result, many human rights commentators have concentrated much 
of their energy on identifying and evaluating those circumstances in which actors within 
the trade regime are required to balance the requirements of trade liberalization with the 
 
111 T. Cottier, 'Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover', (2002) 5(1) Journal of International 
Economic Law 111, 114. 
112 See above n107.  
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demands of those “non-trade values” associated with human rights.113 These 
circumstances typically involve trade-restrictive measures designed to achieve a ‘human 
rights purpose’. (The purpose of the relevant measure ranges widely, from consumer 
protection, to food safety, to public health protection, to protection of minorities.) The 
declared aim of much of this work is to design an institutional and normative framework 
to ensure that decisions involving such sensitive balancing are made in an appropriate, 
sensitive and legitimate manner. Thus, Cottier argues that we: 
 
need a framework which allows equality of legitimate interests to be taken into account, 
brings about practical co-ordination of differing policy goals, and allows for balancing of 
the fundamental interests involved.114 
Different commentators have proposed different means for ensuring that decision-making 
processes within the trade regime take due account of their impact on human rights. The 
UN High Commissioner argues for assessments of the human rights impacts of proposed 
trade rules before they are agreed, as well as direct participation by UN human rights 
bodies in some aspects of the WTO’s work.115 The Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) has reminded WTO Members that they are bound by human 
rights obligations in multilateral trade negotiations.116 Abbott makes a case for the WTO 
to create “highly integrated relations with other multilateral institutions”117; while 
Dommen calls for better integration and the national level, between government 
departments.118 A complementary line of argument addresses questions of allocation of 
 
113 The use of the term “non-trade values”, and analogous terms, is characteristic of the idiom of the 
coherence framework: see, for example, the references in n107 above. 
114T. Cottier, 'Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover', (2002) 5(1) Journal of International 
Economic Law 111, 129. 
115 See, for example, ‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights’, E/CN.4/2002/54, 
15 January 2002, at paragraph 46; ‘Liberalization of trade in services and human rights’, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002, at paragraph 72; ‘Human rights, trade and investment’, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9, 2 July 2003, at paragraph 63. 
116 For example, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15, “The 
right to water”, E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, at paragraph 35. 
117 F.M. Abbott, 'Distributed Governance at the WTO-WIPO: An Evolving Model for Open-Architecture 
Integrated Governance', (2000) 3 Journal of International Economic Law 63, 63. 
118 C. Dommen, 'Human Rights and Trade: Two Practical Suggestions for Promoting Coordination and 
Coherence' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 
199 at 203. 
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decision-making power as between the trade and human rights regimes. Howse and 
Nicolaidis, for example, argue that the trade regime ought (at times) to show deference to 
other international institutions, including those comprising the human rights regime.119 
Trachtman, too, argues that we need “rules that allocate authority” among different 
functional institutions.120 Another important focus of attention has been research into the 
potential use of human rights law to guide decisions made by WTO quasi-judicial bodies, 
in those cases which implicate sensitive normative conflicts. This body of work has 
covered a range of issues: the rules of international law governing questions of priority 
where international legal obligations conflict; the potential uses of human rights law as an 
interpretive guide by WTO panels and the Appellate Body; as well as arguments relating 
to the use of human rights law as a substantive defence to violations of WTO law.121 In a 
similar vein, others have argued for the incorporation of a reference to human rights into 
the texts of WTO agreements, either as an objective of trade liberalization within the 
Preamble, or more specifically in the form of general human rights exception(s) to 
liberalization obligations.122 What is common to all of these mechanisms of co-ordination 
– whether legal, organization or normative – is that they are seen as a response to the 
same basic dilemma: namely, how to ensure that an appropriate balance is struck where 
the imperatives of the liberal trade project must be weighed against the need to protect 
human rights. 
 
Is this, then, a useful and productive way of thinking about the role of human rights 
language in trade policy debates? There is no doubt that this literature on ‘coherence’ 
 
119 R. Howse and K. Nicolaïdis, 'Legitimacy through "Higher Law"? Why Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a 
Step Too Far' in T. Cottier and P.C. Mavroidis (eds.), The role of the judge in international trade 
regulation: experience and lessons for the WTO (2003), 307 
120 J.P. Trachtman, 'The Constitutions of the WTO', (2006) 17(3) European Journal of International Law 
623, 634. 
121 Some key references include, J.P. Trachtman, 'The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution', (1999) 40(2) 
Harvard International Law Journal 333; G. Marceau, 'WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights', 
(2002) 13(4) European Journal of International Law 753; J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of norms in public 
international law: how WTO law relates to other rules of international law (2003); J. Pauwelyn, 'Human 
Rights in WTO Dispute Settlement' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and 
International Trade (2005), 205. 
122 OHCHR, ‘The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on 
human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, 27 June 2001, at paragraph 68; A. Blackett, 'Whither Social Clause? 
Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty Interpretation', (1999) 31(1) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 
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between the trade and human rights regimes has produced important insights and 
research. Nevertheless, I have one significant concern about this literature, the source of 
which lies in the premises on which the coherence framework is based. 
 
As I have explained more fully elsewhere,123 in my view contemporary public debates 
over the international trade regime are fundamentally about the social purpose of the 
liberal trade project. We commonly think of the purpose of the trade regime in stylized, 
functional terms as the liberalization of trade. But the reality is that the regime is 
informed by a much ‘thicker’ sense of purpose, deeply connected to the social and 
political context within which it operates. Over the course of its history, a variety of 
different overarching goals of the postwar trading regime have been given different 
emphases at different times. These include, among others, the reconstruction of postwar 
Europe, the maintenance of international and domestic economic stability, the reduction 
of tariffs (or, at different times, ‘trade barriers’ and ‘trade distortions’), the generation of 
a ‘global market’ in goods and services, and the effort to drive global economic growth. 
124 This evolving sense of purpose plays a hidden but vital role in shaping the architecture 
of the trade regime, as well as specific trade policy decisions at all levels. It helps 
participants understand what they are doing and why, and it influences their attitudes to 
particular trade policies by determining the meaning that such policies have for them. To 
say that contemporary debates are about the ‘social purpose of the liberal trade project’, 
then, is to suggest that these debates represent political contestation over the definition 
and constitution of the trade regime itself, and an opportunity to re-think some of its most 
basic features and orientations.125 
123 Lang, “Whose trade issues? What trade values? Cognitive and Institutional Change in the International 
Trading System” (forthcoming, copy on file with author). 
124 See generally, J.G. Ruggie, 'International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism and 
the postwar economic order' in S.D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (1983), 195; F. Trentmann, 
'Political culture and political economy: interest ideology and free trade', (1998) 5(2) Review of 
International Political Economy 217; F. Trentmann, 'National identity and consumer politics: free trade and 
tariff reform' in D. Winch and P.K. O'Brien (eds.), The Political Economy of British Historical Experience, 
1688-1914 (2002), 215. 
125 Another way of putting this point is that these debates raise questions about the ‘meaning of free trade’, 
see M.N. Barnett and M. Finnemore, 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', 
(1999) 53(4) International Organization 699; D.M. Driesen, 'What is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking 
Behind the Trade and Environment Debate', (2001) 41(2) Virginia Journal of International Law 279; M.N. 
Barnett and M. Finnemore, Rules for the world: international organizations in global politics (2004). 
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From this perspective, the normative conflicts, or ‘values trade-offs’, described earlier 
look different from how they are normally understood. What matters is less in the 
outcomes of those trade-off decisions – that is, which values win out in any particular 
instance – than in the processes by which they are resolved. This is because it is in the 
process of discussing, debating and resolving these normative conflicts that shared ideas 
about the purpose of the liberal trade project are generated and disseminated – it is, after 
all, by reference to such shared ideas that normative conflicts are identified in the first 
place. Thus, from my point of view, the primary reason that decisions involving value 
trade-offs are interesting and important is that they represent a key site in which the 
fundamental goals and value commitments of the trade regime – what we think of when 
we say ‘trade values’ – can be contested, renegotiated and redefined. They represent 
points at which internal contradictions and tensions within prevailing narratives can be 
leveraged to force a re-consideration of the underlying purposes of the regime. Such 
trade-offs are not exceptional, but ubiquitous. And, crucially, they do not involve a 
contest between trade regime and other social projects, but rather are constitutive of the 
liberal trade project itself. 
 
Through the language of coherence and fragmentation, however, such contestation over 
the goals, purposes and normative foundations of the liberal trade project is re-cast as a 
conflict between the liberal trade project and the protection of human rights. It is not 
common to see coherence discourse in this way as discursively re-characterizing 
normative conflicts, as in some sense ‘constructing’ the problem of inter-regime conflict. 
It is much more common to think of inter-regime conflicts as objectively existing – pre-
existing problems demanding solutions. It is worth pausing briefly, therefore, to register 
that conflicts between the trade and human rights regimes are not given but produced,
usually as a result of deliberate and strategic choices by political actors. Helfer’s notion 
of ‘regime-shifting’ provides a useful analytical lens to make this point clear.126 Helfer’s 
 
126 See L.R. Helfer, 'Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking', (2004) 29(1) Yale Journal of International Law 1. See also L.R. Helfer, 
'Mediating Interactions in an Expanding International Intellectual Property Regime' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi 
and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 180. 
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primary concern is with the strategies which participants use when a regime – such as the 
trade regime – begins to evolve in ways which are contrary to their interests. One such 
strategy is that of ‘regime-shifting’. This involves taking particular issues which have 
traditionally fallen within the mandate of (say) the trade regime, and debating and 
discussing these issues in alternative international institutional forums. The purpose of 
this is to generate “counter-regime norms”, which “provide new opportunities for states 
and NGOs to contest established normative orthodoxies”.127 One of the perceived 
benefits of this strategy is that it allows counter-hegemonic actors to reframe their 
arguments as claims for coherence between regimes (rather than as claims for different 
rules which suit their interests better).128 This is seen to be advantageous: after all, it is 
hard not to agree that international organizations ought to work together, and ought not to 
undermine each other. It is particularly hard to disagree with the general principle that the 
trade regime ought not to undermine the human rights regime, and ought not to force its 
Members to violate their human rights obligations. Helfer’s analysis is rich with 
implications, but for present purposes the lesson I wish to draw is a simple one: that 
through the strategy of regime-shifting, normative conflicts over what the trade regime 
ought to be have been re-framed as raising questions about the relationship between the 
trade regime and “other organizations, other sources of international law, and non-trade 
values”, and in particular about the relationship between trade liberalization and the 
protection of human rights.129 In this sense, incoherence between the trade and human 
rights regimes is a choice, not simply an historical fact.  
 
Once this is understood, it becomes apparent that the real question we should be asking is 
not whether human rights language helps us to identify and address trade-off questions in 
a more appropriate or desirable manner. Rather, it is whether it is useful or constructive 
to frame normative conflicts over the trading system as essentially problems of 
incoherence – and as symptoms of the fragmentation of the international system. On 
 
127 L.R. Helfer, 'Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking', (2004) 29(1) Yale Journal of International Law 1, 14. 
128 See Ibid., Part II; L.R. Helfer, 'Mediating Interactions in an Expanding International Intellectual 
Property Regime' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade 
(2005), 180 at 185. 
129 J.P. Trachtman, 'The Constitutions of the WTO', (2006) 17(3) European Journal of International Law 
623, 634. 
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balance, my view is that it is not. Put simply, the reason is that re-framing the argument 
in this way actually undermines and limits the ability of human rights actors to generate 
real change to the trading order. This is counter-intuitive, but relatively easy to explain. 
 
One consequence of deploying the discourse of coherence and fragmentation is that our 
attention is directed away from some of the most important questions that human rights 
actors should be asking of the trade regime. First, as already intimated, questions about 
the underlying value commitments, and social purpose, of the liberal trade project tend to 
be put to one side. In their place, we have constitutionalist discussions about how to 
ensure coherence between the trade project and the human rights project, as well as 
formal discussions about how to resolve legal conflicts between obligations imposed by 
the trade and human rights regimes. Through the language of coherence, critical 
arguments which suggest a need for the re-constitution or reconstruction of the liberal 
trade project have been redirected, so that they are now seen as raising questions which 
are relevant solely to the relation between the WTO and the human rights regime. The 
result is that the underlying purpose of the liberal trade project is neiter discussed nor re-
visioned. Second, the coherence framework diverts our attention away from the value 
choices which are necessarily involved in constituting the liberal trade project. Instead, 
discussion is focussed on the normative conflicts between ‘human rights values’ and (pre-
constituted) ‘trade values’. The result is that there is no indication or exploration of the 
ways in which the values associated with human rights – which of course change 
according to who is speaking, but often include such matters as equality, the protection of 
vulnerable groups and minorities, social welfare, consumer protection, poverty 
elimination, and so on – might be productively involved in contesting and reconstituting 
the liberal trade project in the first place. Within this framework, human rights therefore 
tend to appear in debates about trade policy solely as exceptions, adjuncts, or 
complements to trade policy prescriptions.130 Third, the coherence framework 
discourages critical engagement with the processes by which the trade regime is 
 
130 This is very clearly seen in the fact that much of the trade and human rights literature – at least that 
which operates within the coherence framework – has focussed heavily on GATT Article XX and the 
jurisprudence under it. See, among many examples, OHCHR, Human Rights and World Trade Agreements: 
Using general exceptions clauses to protect human rights, (New York and Geneva: UN, 2005). 
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continually contested and redefined. This is because it reifies the trade regime: the trade 
regime appears to us in this framework unproblematically as an “avatar”131 of particular 
values or social demands. Its internal contradictions, its contingency, its indeterminacy 
are shielded from view. The “politics of regime definition”132 are made invisible, and 
human rights actors are thereby discouraged from contesting them. 
 
Another consequence is that – paradoxically – the coherence framework tends to 
reinforce prevailing ideas about what the trade regime ought to look like. It does this in at 
least a couple of different ways. First of all, I said above that discussions of how to 
resolve conflicts between ‘trade values’ and ‘non-trade values’ tend to produce and 
disseminate shared ideas about what ‘trade values’ are. In the trade and human rights 
debate, the concept of ‘trade values’ – to the extent that it is defined at all – tends to be 
equated with the pursuit of “growth and prosperity”133, the pursuit of material wealth, or 
“efficiency and money”.134 Putting to one side questions about the historical accuracy of 
these characterizations, it is clear that speaking as if these are the values of the trade 
regime helps to make it so. Similarly, speaking as if such values as distributional equity, 
poverty elimination, protection of minorities, and economic and social stability are ‘non-
trade’ or ‘human rights’ values clearly affects the way that the trade regime responds to 
such goals. It makes them marginal to its essential project. The essential point is that how 
we define the boundary between ‘trade’ and ‘human rights’ values affects our 
understanding of what the animating purpose of the trade regime is, and therefore 
profound shapes the deeper structure and operation of the trading system in the longer 
term. Secondly, and less obviously, the mere fact that the objectives, values and 
orientation of the trade regime are treated as pre-given also reinforces the status quo. I
noted at the beginning of this Part that trade policy knowledge tends to be produced and 
evaluated by those with technical expertise, and that it is not clear what human rights 
 
131 Trachtman, "The WTO Constitution: Tertiary Rules for Intertwined  Elephants" (September 1, 2005). 
ExpressO Preprint Series. Working Paper 753. 
132 I borrow this phrase from Koskenniemi in his Chorley Lecture, London School of Economics, June 
2006. 
133 J.P. Trachtman, 'The Constitutions of the WTO', (2006) 17(3) European Journal of International Law 
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actors can add in that domain. The coherence framework essentially attempts to sidestep 
these difficulties: while we may look to technical experts to tell us what the international 
trading system ought to look like, these experts tell us nothing about how to resolve 
trade-offs between the demands of rational trade policy and other social demands – nor 
can they. Even within a framework of technical rationality, such trade-offs are inevitably 
a question of values, not a question of knowledge. The problem with this move is that it 
reinforces the sense that questions of ‘pure’ trade policy raise solely technical questions 
(not value trade-offs), and that these questions are not an appropriate domain of 
contestation for human rights actors. That is, the coherence framework helps to exclude 
human rights actors from debates about ‘pure’ trade policy – that is, about what trade 
policy and the trade regime ought ideally to look like – and to reinforce the claims that 
such questions are appropriately determined by traditional experts deploying prevailing 
trade policy knowledge. 
 
Against these criticisms that I have advanced, it may be argued that, even if the discourse 
of coherence forecloses certain transformative possibilities, it opens up others. This is an 
important point, and it is emphatically not my claim that the trade and human rights 
literature arising from the coherence framework is unproductive or fruitless. 
Nevertheless, on present evidence the possibilities that this framework opens seem to me 
to be far less important than those which it forecloses. For example, I am somewhat 
sceptical that the use of human rights law as an interpretive guide to WTO law will often 
make a significant difference to how WTO agreements are ultimately interpreted. After 
all, a requirement to consider the content of (often ambiguous) human rights instruments 
will in my view have little effect unless the decision-makers are already sensitive to the 
values which such instruments are designed to protect, and predisposed to interpreting 
WTO law in a way which respects them. Conversely, if such sensitivity is present, it is 
not clear that the interpretive guidance provided by human rights instruments adds much 
other than a more legally sound justification for those decision-makers. Similarly, 
without wishing to downplay either the desirability or importance of inter-institutional 
collaboration, it is easy to see how most of the proposed mechanisms of inter-regime 
engagement – formal and informal collaborations, mutual observer status, systematic 
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consideration of mutual impact, and so on – might have little actual impact on the 
outcomes of the trading system, and in the end actually substitute for a more 
thoroughgoing, reconstitution from the ground up of the trade regime itself. It is for these 
reasons that I see the discourse on fragmentation and coherence as, in the end, limiting, 
channelling and constraining the potentially disruptive and destabilizing influence of 
critical human rights voices.  
 
2.  Human rights as substantive policy guidance 
 
Not all interventions into the trade and human rights debate see the debate primarily in 
terms of inter-regime coherence. It is also very common to see human rights as offering a 
normative framework for substantively reorienting trade policy and the trade regime. The 
core claim is here that human rights norms, principles and rules can help to guide trade 
policy-makers as they re-design the international trading system, and as they make 
difficult trade policy choices. In a speech entitled “Shaping Globalization: the Role of 
Human Rights”, for example, Mary Robinson argues for the need to “bring the values of 
international human rights to the tables where decisions about the global economy are 
bring made”.135 Howse and Mutua have similarly suggested that “the spirit of human 
rights law must frame the development of trade law”,136 while Green refers to the need to 
“see [the] WTO and other trade mechanisms restrained by human rights standards”.137 In 
this model, human rights values and rules define the boundaries of acceptable trade 
policy choices, and provide the substantive basis of an alternative vision for the 
international trading system. 
 
There have been a number of attempts to flesh out a little what this might look like. One 
of the most influential of these attempts is that of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
 
135 M. Robinson, 'Shaping Globalization: The Role of Human Rights (Fifth Annual Grotius Lecture)' in  
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 2003 (2003), 1, available at  
http://www.realizingrights.org/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=118
136 R. Howse and M. Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World 
Trade Organisation, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (2000). 
137 M. Green, 'Integrating Enforcement of Human Rights Laws with Enforcement of Trade Laws: Some 
Baseline Issues' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade 
(2005), 236 at 237. 
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Rights, in the context of the series of reports referred to earlier.138 Apart from procedural 
prescriptions (dealt with below), the Human Commissioner argues, for example, that a 
human rights approach to trade liberalization “sets the promotion and protection of 
human rights as objectives of trade liberalization, not as exceptions.”139 At the level of 
general principle, the High Commissioner believes that a human rights approach is 
cautious about “relying [solely] on market forces to resolve problems concerning human 
welfare”, and instead “emphasises the role of the State in the process of liberalization”.140 
The High Commissioner also emphasizes the importance of international co-operation as 
a primary means of achieving a fairer and more equitable international order.141 At a 
normative level, a human rights approach to trade liberalization is said also to “focus on 
individuals, in particular vulnerable individuals and groups”.142 Thus trade policies which 
have an adverse impact on such groups tend not to be favoured by human rights. This last 
point has been picked up and developed by others. Dommen, for example, argues that the 
focus of human rights on “the most vulnerable and disadvantaged sectors of society” is 
the “yardstick” which enables them to provide substantive policy guidance. A human 
rights approach “will assess the effects of a particular policy on the most vulnerable 
people within a country and will rule against choices that involve discrimination”.143 
Notwithstanding the utility of these more general claims, it is clear that greater specificity 
is required if human rights norms are to provide genuinely meaningful guidance to trade 
policy-makers.144 While of course it is not in the nature of human rights principles to be 
fully reducible to a universal set of policy prescriptions, nevertheless there would seem to 
 
138 See above n4. 
139 OHCHR, ‘Liberalization of trade in services and human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002, at 
para 7. 
140 Id., at para 10. 
141 Id., at para 13. 
142 Id., at para 9. 
143 C. Dommen, 'Human Rights and Trade: Two Practical Suggestions for Promoting Coordination and 
Coherence' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 
199 at 202. 
144 See, for example, F. Abbott, 'The 'Rule of Reason' and the Right to Health: Integrating Human Rights 
and Competition Principles in the context of TRIPS' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human 
Rights and International Trade (2005), 279 at 294; C. Breining-Kaufman, 'The Right to Food and Trade in 
Agriculture' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 
341 at 359. Alvarez has criticised the deployment of human rights law for this reason: J.E. Alvarez, 'How 
Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade Regime', (2001) 7 Widener Law Symposium 
Journal 1. 
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be value in enhancing the specificity of human rights obligations as they apply to trade 
policy, and thereby enhancing their practical utility to policy-makers. If it is not possible 
to specify fully and in advance the kinds of trade policy which are prohibited or required 
by human rights law, at least some examples can be developed, and a process and 
methodology can be refined by which these questions can be answered in particular 
contexts. So, those commentators who see the role of human rights in these terms – as 
providing substantive policy guidance – largely see their task as spelling out in more 
detail the precise normative and legal content of human rights as they apply in the field of 
trade policy, so as to increase their utility as guiding principles. 
 
How might this be done? The basic logic is clear: governments must not implement 
certain trade policies where to do so would lead to a violation of their human rights 
obligations; and they must conversely pursue those trade policies which, in their 
circumstances, facilitate the progressive enjoyment of human rights. As applied to the 
WTO, the basic claim is that WTO law must not require particular trade policies to the 
extent that they may undermine the enjoyment of human rights, nor is it permitted to 
prohibit policies to the extent that they enhance the enjoyment of human rights.145 This in 
turn leads to a particular form of enquiry: elaboration of the normative and legal content 
of the relevant human right; analysis of different trade policies (and WTO rules) and their 
practical effects; a comparison of those effects to the kinds of outcomes envisaged or 
required by the relevant right; and set of proposals for changes to either trade policies or 
WTO rules to make them conform more closely to what human rights obligations require. 
In this way, general human rights norms can apparently be transformed into into concrete 
policy prescriptions. 
 
An example will help to make the critique I advance below clearer. The High 
Commissioner’s report on liberalization of trade in services is in a typical form. After an 
introduction to the notion of ‘trade in services’ and the basic framework of the General 
 
145 There are also two further logical implications, though they tend in practice to be emphasized less: (a) 
that WTO law ought to prohibit particular trade policies which clearly undermine human rights, and (b) that 
WTO law ought to require those trade policies which are clearly of benefit to the enjoyment of human 
rights.  
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Agreement on Trade in Services, the High Commissioner spends considerable time 
setting out in some detail the content of the rights to health, education and development, 
drawing on the General Comments of CESCR in doing so.146 The Commissioner 
emphasises, among other things, that the right to health covers the availability, 
accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities, that states have an obligation to 
take the right into account when negotiating trade treaties, that states have a tripartite 
obligation to ‘respect, protect, and fulfil’ the right, and that the implementation of any 
retrogressive policy will usually constitute a violation.147 In the next section, the High 
Commissioner analyzes the outcomes of particular forms of services liberalization, 
emphasizing the negative outcomes that can arise. For example, foreign direct investment 
in health services can result, it is argued, in a “two-tiered service supply with a corporate 
segment focussed on the healthy and wealthy and an underfinanced public sector 
focussing on the poor and the sick”. Similarly, “the introduction of user fees can reduce 
and even cut off service supply to the poor”.148 In order to ensure that services 
liberalization works for human rights, the High Commissioner therefore observes, strict 
monitoring and strong regulatory oversight of private service supplies will often be 
essential.149 In the next section, the High Commissioner analyzes the extent to which the 
disciplines in the GATS may actually impede the ability of governments to provide such 
regulatory oversight, and therefore their ability to protect human rights. The report 
therefore argues that WTO Members ought to take a cautious approach to making GATS 
commitments, that the GATS ought to be construed in various ways which allow greater 
policy space for social regulation, and that a mechanism should be put in place to ensure 
that Members can withdraw commitments where services liberalization ultimately 
undermines the enjoyment of human rights.150 
Of course, there are innumerable other examples I might have used. Precisely the same 
structure of argumentation has been used to claim that the right to health requires 
 
146 OHCHR, ‘Liberalization of trade in services and human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002, at 
paras 28-37. 
147 Id., paras 29-32. 
148 Id., para 44. 
149 Id., para 50. 
150 Id., paras 56-64. 
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amendments to Article 31(f) of the TRIPs agreement,151 that the right to food requires the 
reduction of domestic agricultural subsidies in industrialized countries,152 that the right to 
health requires WTO dispute settlement bodies to take a deferential attitude to 
precautionary food safety legislation,153 and so on. 
 
The question which interests me is what role human rights norms and principles play in 
this kind of analysis? It is common to talk as if human rights are in some sense the source 
of the ultimate policy prescriptions in this kind of analysis – that human rights rules 
provide the criteria by which to arbitrate between alternative trade policy proposals. In 
fact, it takes only a moment’s thought to realise that precisely the opposite is occurring: 
human rights commentators are drawing on work produced by leading trade policy 
experts, in the context of contemporary trade policy debates as a source of policy ideas 
and arguments. There is invariably something of a shift in register when these 
commentators move from the first stage of their argument (the elaboration of human 
rights norms), to the second (the evaluation of particular trade policy proposals). When it 
comes to the analysis and evaluation of concrete policy proposals – and remember that 
within this model the elaboration of concrete proposals is precisely the point of the 
intervention – the discussion invariably tends to reproduce and rehearse precisely the 
same kinds of arguments which characterize trade policy discussions in other arenas, and 
which are perfectly familiar to trade policy experts. At this point, the human rights 
 
151 Clear and well-argued examples of this form of argumentation in the context of the TRIPs agreement 
and the right to health are F. Abbott, 'The 'Rule of Reason' and the Right to Health: Integrating Human 
Rights and Competition Principles in the context of TRIPS' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), 
Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 279 and S.F. Musungu, 'The Right to Health, Intellectual 
Property, and Competition Principles' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and 
International Trade (2005), 301. Others include: S. Edwardson, 'Reconciling TRIPS and the Right to Food' 
in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 381; P. 
Ranjan, 'International Trade and Human Rights: Conflicting Obligations' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. 
Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 311 
152 For two excellent academic papers, see Simons, “Human Security, Corporate Accountability and the 
Regulation of Trade and Investment”, CCHS, Human Security Fellowship Working Paper, March 2004 
(copy on file with author), and C. Breining-Kaufman, 'The Right to Food and Trade in Agriculture' in T. 
Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 341. See also the 
important report of the OHCHR, ‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights’, 
E/CN.4/2002/54, 15 January 2002. 
153 For example, A. Orford, 'Contesting Globalization: A Feminist Perspective on the Future of Human 
Rights', (1998) 8(2) Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 171; C. Dommen, 'Raising Human 
Rights Concerns in the World Trade Organization: Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies', (2002) 24(1) 
Human Rights Quarterly 1. 
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language recedes into the background, and we are presented with a series of 
argumentative steps, sets of data, and ultimately policy prescriptions, which almost 
exactly reproduce those emanating from more traditional trade policy circles. 
 
The point is that essentially all of the intellectual heavy lifting in these analyses is not 
done by human rights norms at all, but by precisely the kinds of technical argumentation 
which human rights purport to augment. After all, we don’t need human rights to tell us 
that private providers of essential services need strict regulatory oversight. Nor do we 
need human rights to tell us that domestic agricultural subsidies ought to be reduced, nor 
that developing countries may at times need the flexibility to impose tariffs on 
agricultural imports. It is clear that what is actually happening in this kind of scholarship 
is that policy proposals and supporting arguments are being borrowed from contemporary 
trade policy discourse, and re-articulated in human rights terms. I am not suggesting that 
human rights commentators tend to reproduce orthodox opinion on these questions. In 
fact, the opposite is almost always the case: human rights have come to be seen as a 
language for articulating counter-orthodox critique of certain kinds of prevailing trade 
policy consensus. But, regardless of the substantive positions taken, the point is that the 
discussion of trade policy matters draws on precisely the same set of arguments, in 
essentially the same way, as have characterized trade policy discussions for some time. 
Any policy proposals which are put forward in these analyses therefore cannot 
meaningfully be said to be derived from human rights norms in any direct way, and in 
fact usually appear to have only an attenuated and relatively obscure connection to the 
human rights obligations set out at the start. 
 
The result is that one can often be left wondering why it is necessary for these policy 
proposals to be framed in human rights terms.154 There may even be positive 
disadvantages in doing so. First, and most simply, framing the argument in human rights 
 
154 Breining-Kaufman alludes to a similar difficulty in her study of the trade and the right to food: “What is 
the motivation for a rights-based approach to food? Would it not be sufficient hunger and malnutrition as a 
serious moral evil or violation of a basic need?”: C. Breining-Kaufman, 'The Right to Food and Trade in 
Agriculture' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 
341 at 359. Her response seems essentially to be the desirability of the strong moral and legal imperative 
associated with rights-based approaches. 
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terms seems merely to confuse matters, and to add an extra, unnecessary, layer of 
analysis. Would it not be better and simpler for policy-makers to engage directly with the 
pros and cons of policy proposals, without having these arguments mediated through the 
prism of human rights? Second, re-framing traditional trade policy arguments in human 
rights terms may unhelpfully mystify policy debates: to speak as if particular trade policy 
choices were somehow mandated by human rights rules risks obscuring their 
contestability, lending them a falsely inflated legitimacy, and stifling ongoing debate 
about desirable trade policy. After all, whether or not they are put forward by human 
rights actors, these proposals may be mistaken, or superseded by better or different 
knowledge, and ought always to be open to question. Third, there is the risk that this kind 
of intervention can undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of human rights 
themselves, by promising more than can be delivered. Within this framework, human 
rights are offered as a means of determining right or wrong answers to trade policy 
questions, a means of conclusively determining better or worse trade policy. The more 
that human rights actors try to make good this promise – that is, the more that they 
attempt to turn human rights principles into concrete policy proposals – then the more the 
trade and human rights debate becomes just another debate about the optimality of 
particular trade policies, a subject on which human rights actors have no particularly 
special expertise. Within this frame, human rights actors find themselves simply playing 
the role of a conduit: passive recipients of technical knowledge produced elsewhere, re-
articulating that knowledge in the language of human rights. As a result, the peculiar 
authority of human rights themselves can be dissipated, as it becomes equated with the 
persuasiveness of the technical knowledge on which it draws, and with the mastery by 
human rights actors of technical trade policy knowledge. 
 
Let me finish this section with two clarifications. First, I am not suggesting that framing 
trade policy arguments in human rights terms performs no beneficial function. On the 
contrary, in the sections which follow I try to spell out a number of other very important 
functions that it performs very usefully. My basic claim is rather that we need to be clear 
about what kind of work human rights is doing in this kind of analysis, and what it is not. 
I do not think that human rights are providing substantive guidance for policy-makers, 
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and it seems to me counter-productive to claim that this is what is happening. Second, I 
also am not suggesting that human rights rules cannot be developed and used in a way 
which gives concrete direction to trade policy-makers. My claim is merely that present 
attempts to do that end up as not much more than a process of reflecting and re-
articulating policy proposals and arguments already circulating in trade policy debates. 
We need to look elsewhere, and think harder, if we are to understand the role that human 
rights norms play in contemporary trade policy debates. 
 
3. Human rights as political technologies 
 
When one asks NGOs and other commentators why they use the language of human 
rights in their critiques of the trade regime, one of the most common responses is that 
human rights rhetoric can add weight to the policy arguments that they make. Even if we 
do not need human rights to tell us that domestic agricultural subsidies ought to be 
reduced, so this argument typically runs, it is helpful to be able to say authoritatively that 
this reduction is required by human rights law, because it endows that claim with a 
degree of moral legitimacy, the force of legal obligation, and a sense that they are 
somehow beyond the possibility of compromise or negotiation. In short, the deployment 
of human rights language is said to make policy/political claims more persuasive and 
ultimately more effective. The legal framework human rights provide is often said to be 
particularly important. There seems to be a perception that, through the trade regime, 
certain powerful interests have been able to entrench their trade policy preferences in 
binding legal form, and that human rights law provides a (satisfyingly symmetrical) 
means of contesting that political move in kind. Human rights, it is often said, are not just 
“aspirational moral principles”, they are “norms codified in international law”.155 
However these arguments are framed, the fundamental point is clear: that the human 
rights movement offers a variety of political technologies which may be used to achieve 
desirable trade policy outcomes, and that the use of human rights language makes 
available a variety of strategies which can be used to exert considerable political pressure. 
 
155 International Federation for Human Rights, “Understanding Global Trade and Human Rights”, July 
2005, 3, available at www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/wto423a.pdf.
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The techniques typically used by human rights actors to achieve political outcomes can 
take a number of forms.156 First, the characterization of particular aspects of trade policy 
as ‘human rights issues’ can help to mobilize transnational human rights advocacy 
networks. These networks have proved to be effective mechanisms for raising public 
awareness, shaping public opinion, uniting disparate political actors, and generating 
broad-based global consensuses in favour of particular policy objectives. They can bring 
powerful pressures to bear on policy-makers through grassroots campaigning and direct 
lobbying efforts. In the context of trade policy, the TRIPS and public health campaign is 
an obvious example. The engagement of UN human rights bodies on this issue, and the 
consequent mobilization of the human rights movement more generally, in my view 
influenced the dynamic of that debate in powerful ways. Human rights institutions and 
actors added weight to the campaign for the modification of TRIPS commitments, by 
lending additional legitimacy, new constituencies, and an institutional voice for those 
groups pressuring for change. The deployment of human rights language also helped to 
frame the debate in terms of justice and fairness, and through the mobilization of moral 
outrage, helped to generate a widespread sense that the TRIPS agreement in its current 
form could not be justified. Experience with this campaign has had the result that many 
human rights actors in the field of international trade now see their primary role as 
working closely with activist or lobby groups – particular those with a developing 
country focus – demonstrating to them how human rights language and human rights law 
might be strategically deployed to help their achieve their policy agenda. Similarly, 
others work hard to get particular trade policy projects on the agenda of human rights 
institutions, and use any resulting resolutions or reports as a tool in ongoing advocacy 
and lobbying efforts.157 
156 These and other techniques have been explained in studies of the role of the human rights regime in 
other substantive policy areas. See, for example, the various contributions to T. Risse-Kappen, C. Ropp 
Steve and K. Sikkink, The power of human rights: international norms and domestic change (1999), as 
well as R. Goodman and D. Jinks, 'How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights 
Law', (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621. 
157 International Federation for Human Rights, “Understanding Global Trade and Human Rights”, July 
2005, 11ff., as well as the mission statement of 3D (Human Rights, Trade, Equitable Economy), available 
at www.3Dthree.org.  
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Second, as Helfer has noted, the human rights regime can provide an institutional space 
for the development of norms about trade policy which are different from, and contrary 
to, those circulating within the trade regime.158 Soft law instruments and declarations 
produced by consensus within a human rights framework can then feed back into the 
trade regime, as other countries seek to use such norms as a lever in trade negotiations, 
exploiting the “civilising force of hypocrisy” to extract concessions in the domain of 
trade politics.159 A submission to the Committee on Agriculture by a number of 
developing countries, in the context of a review of how the Agreement on Agriculture 
might address ‘non-trade’ concerns, provides an interesting example of this process.160 In 
this submission, these developing countries referred explicitly to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and to the work of the CESCR on the right to food in 
support of their proposals for reform to the agreement. While it is hard to say how 
effective this strategy might be in any particular context, a number of commentators have 
drawn attention to this example as illustrative of the general potential of such 
strategies.161 Third, the elaboration of international human rights law relating to trade 
policy may provide an impetus for the use of domestic human rights enforcement 
mechanisms to influence governments’ trade policy positions. The most obvious example 
comes from South Africa, where proceedings were initiated on the basis of the 
constitutional right to health, in respect of health policies closely related to the TRIPS 
and public health campaign.162 
Fourth, international human rights treaty-monitoring bodies may help to generate 
pressure for policy change in a variety of ways. CESCR, for example, routinely examines 
 
158 See generally L.R. Helfer, 'Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking', (2004) 29(1) Yale Journal of International Law 1, 58; L.R. Helfer, 
'Mediating Interactions in an Expanding International Intellectual Property Regime' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi 
and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 180 at 184. 
159 Elster (ed), Deliberative Democracy, (1998). 
160 “Note on Non-Trade Concerns”, Committee on Agriculture Special Session, WTO Document 
G/AG/NG/W/36/Rev.1, 9 November 2000. 
161 For example, C. Breining-Kaufman, 'The Right to Food and Trade in Agriculture' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi 
and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 341 at 349. 
162 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign, Constitutional Court of South Africa, Case CCT 8/02, 
5 July 2002. See generally F. Abbott, 'The 'Rule of Reason' and the Right to Health: Integrating Human 
Rights and Competition Principles in the context of TRIPS' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), 
Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 279 at 294. 
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certain aspects of countries’ trade policies for their consistency with human rights norms. 
In a recent country review of Ecuador, the CESCR heard submissions from NGOs 
concerned about the potential impact of FTAA and US-Andean FTA negotiations on 
access to medicines in Ecuador, and expressed concern to the Ecuadorean 
representative.163 It is true that such review processes are of varying effectiveness in 
achieving real policy change, and rely on softer processes of awareness-raising, 
persuasion and normative socialization to work. But while a degree of scepticism is 
useful, at the same time we should not write these processes too quickly as ineffective. 
There is evidence that the Ecuadorean representative in question at least forcefully 
transmitted CESCR’s concern to those government departments involved in trade 
negotiations, and began a process of involving human rights norms in the crafting of 
negotiating positions.164 It has been suggested that such processes are more effective in 
the case of smaller countries, simply because the same official represents the country in 
both the trade and human rights regimes. 
 
This strategic deployment of human rights language, and human rights mechanisms, can 
be critiqued on a number of grounds. Some critique it on the basis of the desirability of 
the policy proposals advocated. I have previously said that the substantive merits of 
human rights claims are beyond the scope of this article, so I cannot engage in detail with 
these arguments here. Suffice to say that while it is true that the policy agenda advanced 
under the banner of human rights may in principle be mistaken, counter-productive or 
covertly deployed for the benefit of the powerful, it is also true that so far most aspects of 
this policy agenda – amendment of the TRIPS agreement, the reduction of domestic 
agricultural support, further special and differential treatment for developing countries – 
have enjoyed broad-based public support. Others critique this framework on the basis of 
its effectiveness. There are numerous commentators who are sceptical of the ability of the 
‘soft’ mechanisms of the human rights regime to achieve real political change. In relation 
to the TRIPS and public health campaign, for example, Picciotto suggests that 
 
163 See, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of CESCR: 
Ecuador”, E/C.12/1/Add.100, 7 June 2004, esp. para 55; “Trade-related intellectual property rights, access 
to medicines and the right to health”, April 2004, report submitted to CESCR by 3D (Human Rights, Trade, 
Equitable Economy), available at  http://www.citizen.org/documents/3D_IP_Ecuador_AFTA.pdf.
164 Interview with NGO representative closely involved in process, June 2006. 
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[a]lthough the political impact of the campaign has been very important, especially due to the 
global awareness of the AIDS issue, it is doubtful that the invocation of human rights 
discourses has had more than a marginal effect. The same can be said of the global campaign 
that resulted in the compromise in the Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health and its subsequent implementation by WTO Council Decisions. 
 
Even if one concedes the effectiveness of human rights mechanisms in other fields of 
policy and politics, there may be reason to doubt their practical utility in respect of 
international economic matters. Human rights institutions are still in the process of 
building up their authority and legitimacy in relation to these matters, and arguably are 
not yet in a position to speak as persuasively on international economic matters as they 
are in other fields. Furthermore, the human rights movement is also still building the 
necessary links with policy-makers to make direct lobbying efforts practically effective. 
At the same time, one ought not to draw conclusions too quickly: ultimately, it is an 
empirical question what practical effect the human rights movement may have on the 
political dynamics of trade policy in the longer term, and one which it is difficult to 
predict in advance. 
 
My primary concern about this model is somewhat different. It is that in this model the 
human rights movement still is given no role in policy debates – that is, in generating new 
ideas about desirable and appropriate trade policy, or alternative visions of the 
international trading system. That is to say, in this model the human rights movement 
does not engage in the domain of policy ideas and policy knowledge. It is still figured as 
a passive recipient of policy knowledge, and is seen as being deployed in the service of a 
policy agenda still defined in the context of traditional trade policy debates. Trade policy 
elites, deploying traditional conceptual frameworks, still play the role of gatekeepers of 
policy ideas, monopolizing the production, evaluation and authorization of acceptable 
policy proposals. Thus, the human rights movement can be effective in achieving positive 
change only where the ‘problem’ is not lack of imagination but rather the lack of political 
will. It may be a useful tool, that is to say, where we know what policy ought to be 
pursued, but where mobilizing constituencies in favour of it, and overcoming political 
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obstacles to change, is difficult. The human rights movement can do nothing, however, to 
remedy those flaws in the international trading order which arise as a consequence of 
prevailing policy knowledge – or rather as a consequence of its flaws, blindspots and 
other inadequacies. The influence of human rights actors is most likely to be strong 
where they are advocating policies consistent with the prevailing technical knowledge, 
and necessarily weaker and less convincing where they choose to advocate policies 
supported only by unorthodox or non-mainstream experts. Put another way, to the extent 
that the international trading system is already structured and informed by orthodox 
knowledge – and in my view this is a very significant extent – the human rights 
movement has in this model no critical or transformative power at all.  
 
4.  Human rights as a trigger for policy learning 
 
Let me turn, then, to confront this problem directly. I have said that the human rights 
movement must engage in the domain of knowledge, because transformative change to 
the international trading order cannot easily occur without the production of ‘new 
thinking’ about the kinds of trade policies which are desirable and legitimate, and the 
kinds of governance structures through which political power is constituted and exercised 
in the trading order. I have suggested that none of the three models considered in the 
previous section provide any solid basis for thinking about how the human rights 
movement may be involved in that production. While it is common to speak as if human 
rights norms may provide the substance of an alternative vision for the international 
trading order, in my view that promise is illusory. Furthermore, the discourse of 
fragmentation and coherence – propagated in part within the trade and human rights 
debate – may actually make such ‘new thinking’ more difficult, by reinforcing prevailing 
views and entrenching the hold of traditional experts over them. Does this mean that, in 
the end, the human rights movement has only a marginal role to play in the ongoing 
evolution of the trading system? The answer is still not clear, but I think not, and in this 
section my aim is to sketch, in preliminary form, a fourth model for the engagement of 
the human rights movement in trade policy debates to explain why. Put most simply, the 
claim I make is that the human rights movement can facilitate the production of new 
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forms of policy knowledge about the trading system. Even if human rights are not in 
themselves a source of new policy ideas, human rights interventions into trade policy 
debates perform the crucial function of providing a trigger for ‘policy learning’, and 
helping to create the conditions in which learning is more likely. That is to say, the 
engagement of human rights voices and actors in trade debates acts as an impetus for the 
evolution of ideas about what is rational and desirable trade policy. 
 
The kind of ‘policy learning’ that I have in mind can take a number of different forms, 
and occur in a number of different ways.165 First, it may involve a change in the nature of 
‘causal beliefs’ held by policy-makers. Contemporary ideas about desirable trade policy 
rest on particular understandings about the economic dynamics of the trading system: the 
impact of trade flows on allocative and dynamic efficiency; the relationship between 
factor endowments and patterns of international trade; the causal determinants of the 
changing size, composition and direction of trade flows; and so on. They also rest on 
another set of causal understandings about the political dynamics of the trade system – 
such as the belief that the dynamics of domestic trade politics predispose governments 
towards protectionism, or the belief that retaliation is the likely result of a unilateral 
decision to raise trade barriers. One form of learning, then, consists of a modification or 
refinement of this kind of causal belief. Second, learning may involve changes to ‘policy 
beliefs’, that is, ideas about the kinds of policies which ought to be pursued in light of our 
best understanding of the causal dynamics of the trading system. These can themselves be 
broken down into a number of levels. At the lowest level, there can be an evolution in 
prevailing ideas about the best technical means of achieving policy goals. In the context 
of the WTO, this may involve changing ideas about what bargaining position to take 
within multilateral trade negotiations. At the national level, it may involve fine-tuning 
ideas about which sectors to liberalize, in what order, and what kinds of flanking policies 
are needed to make a program of liberalization successful. At a somewhat deeper level, 
 
165 See generally, J.S. Levy, 'Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield', (1994) 48(2) 
International Organization 279. 
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learning can involve a change to ‘strategic policy beliefs’.166 In the international context, 
prevailing strategic beliefs may include: the belief that liberalization is most effectively 
achieved through the exchange of reciprocal trade concessions; the belief that questions 
related to the distributive and equity effects of the international trading system ought to 
be addressed at the national level; or the belief that the international trade regime ought 
ideally to strive for universality in its membership and coverage. Finally, at the deepest 
level, learning can involve a change in nature of the overarching goals towards which 
trade policy-making is directed (or the relative weight given to different goals). I noted 
above some of the different goals which have informed the operation of the postwar 
trading system at different periods in its history.167 
Policy learning – at any level – is not an automatic or natural process: certain conditions 
and policy-making environments are conducive to learning, while others are not; and 
certain organizations are better at learning than others.168 Without more detailed study, it 
is hard to speak in general terms about the extent to which the international trade regime 
helps to generate a policy-making environment which is conducive to learning. Certainly 
it is not hard to point to at least one or two periods in the history of the postwar order in 
which policy learning of a profound kind appears to have occurred.169 At the same time, 
it is also possible to point to a number of features of the trade regime which inhibit 
learning – and it is these obstacles which the activity of the human rights movement helps 
to overcome. 
 
166 This term is taken from P. Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy: In search of an elusive 
concept' in G.W. Breslauer and P. Tetlock (eds.), Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy (1991), xiv at 
27. 
167 See above text accompanying n124. 
168 For some of the conditions which make some organizations better learners than others, see B. Hedberg, 
'How Organizations Learn and Unlearn' in P.C. Nystrom and W.H. Starbuck (eds.), Handbook of 
organizational design (1981), xxii and generally B. Levitt and J. March, 'Organizational Learning', (1988) 
14 Annual Review of Sociology 319; C. Argyris and D.A. Schön, Organizational learning II: theory, 
method and practice (1996). 
169 The period from the beginning of the Tokyo Round, through the Uruguay Round, until the creation of 
WTO is the clearest example. 
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Firstly, and most simply, the work of a variety of organizational theorists reminds us of 
the importance of feedback loops in the facilitation of organizational learning.170 Causal 
and policy beliefs change through response to environmental stimuli – in other words, 
through the process of continuously monitoring the outcomes of policy choices, and by 
systematically incorporating the lessons learnt into processes of policy formation and re-
formation. The international trade regime, however, has always lacked a systematic, 
institutionalized system of monitoring the impact of decisions taken within it, and feeding 
back lessons learnt into new decision-making processes.171 It is true that the committee 
system established with the WTO in 1995 to some degree began to reflexively monitor 
the activity of the WTO. However, these monitoring activities are focussed primarily on 
questions of compliance and implementation, rather than on reflexively evaluating the 
effects and outcomes of the WTO agreements itself. By contrast, over the past decade or 
so, human rights actors – and indeed transnational civil society networks more generally 
– have helped to perform precisely this function. A very large proportion of the work 
undertaken by human rights actors consists of collecting and collating information on the 
outcomes produced by the international trading system, formulating it into a relatively 
coherent and systematic body of knowledge, and repeatedly bringing it to the attention of 
trade policy-making elites. In doing so, they have helped to provide the impetus for 
learning by these policy-makers – that is, for a rethinking of beliefs which these policy-
makers hold concerning how the trading system operates, and what the outcomes of their 
interventions are likely to be.  
 
Of course, there are certainly ways in which human rights might more effectively be used 
to perform this function. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has very 
strongly advocated integrating a human-rights based feedback function more closely into 
trade policy-making processes, at both the national and international levels. The High 
Commissioner suggests the need for a “a constant examination of trade law and policy”, 
 
170 See generally B. Hedberg, 'How Organizations Learn and Unlearn' in P.C. Nystrom and W.H. Starbuck 
(eds.), Handbook of organizational design (1981), xxii. 
171 It is true that the Committee system set up with the WTO in 1995 to some degree performs the reflexive 
function of monitoring the activity of the WTO. However, these monitoring activities are focussed 
primarily on questions of compliance and implementation, rather than on reflexively evaluating the effects 
and outcomes of the WTO agreements itself. Hoekman makes this observation in relation to the TPRM: B. 
Hoekman, 'Making the WTO More Supportive of Development', (2005) 42 Finance and Development 14. 
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arguing that “assessing the potential and real impact of trade policy law and policy is 
perhaps the principal means of avoiding implementation of any retrogressive 
measure”.172 The High Commissioner therefore repeatedly calls for systematic ‘human 
rights impact assessments’ both before and after decision are made.173 Taking up this 
challenge, a number of preliminary attempts have been made to set out methodologies for 
carrying out such assessments.174 In my view, this work represents a valuable attempt to 
use human rights to drive policy learning in more effective ways – that is, to use human 
rights law to institutionalize and routinize practices of monitoring and feedback within 
trade policy-making processes.  
 
Secondly, the human rights movement can help initiate reflection on the broader goals 
and values which the trading system is designed to achieve, and the responsibilities which 
trade policy-makers see themselves as bearing. Commentators such as Barnett and 
Finnemore have noted that there can be a tendency in international organizations for the 
broader goals associated with an institutional project to fade from view over time, and 
institutional actors to focus on institutionalized rules, routines, practices and procedures 
in themselves and for their own sake.175 The result can be a lack of any critical reflection 
on those original goals and the broader project which gives the institution its direction, to 
determine whether they need to be updated as circumstances change. There are certainly 
indications of this dynamic in the context of the trade regime. It is reflected not only in 
the relative lack of discussion of the issue, but also in the fact that, to the extent that the 
purpose of the trading system is discussed, commentators generally settle for ‘thin’ and 
stylized versions – such as the liberalization of international trade, or the reduction of 
trade barriers – which say nothing meaningful about the social purpose of the regime. 
 
172 OHCHR, ‘Liberalization of trade in services and human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002, at 
para 12. 
173 See above n115. 
174 See, for example, S. Walker, 'Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade-Related Policies' in M. 
Gehring and M.-C. Cordonnier-Segger (eds.), Sustainable Development in World Trade Law and 
Jurisprudence (2005), 217; Humanist Committee on Human Rights, Matching Practice With Principles: 
Human Rights Impact Assessment: EU Opportunities (2002), available at 
www.hom.nl/publicaties/Matching_practice_with_principles.pdf; Radstaake and de Vries, Reinvigorating human 
rights in the Barcelona Process: using Human Rights Impact Assessment to enhance mainstreaming of 
human rights (Mar. 2004), available at www.hom.nl/publicaties/Morocco_paper_and_bibliography.pdf.
175 M.N. Barnett and M. Finnemore, Rules for the world: international organizations in global politics 
(2004), Chapter 2. 
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Again, it is clear that the human rights movement has at least the potential to counter-act 
these tendencies, and to help create an environment in which reflection on the trade 
policy goals is facilitated and encouraged. One of the most obvious characteristics of 
human rights interventions into trade debates is their preoccupation with the ultimate 
ends to which the international trading system is directed, and in particular the claim that 
trade liberalization ought not be pursued as if it were ‘an end in itself”. While I have 
made it clear that I do not think ‘human rights’ themselves necessarily provide a vision of 
the most appropriate ends towards which the trade regime ought to be striving176, human 
right actors have nevertheless been instrumental in generating something of a renewed 
critical debate about the social purposes of the international trading system. By forcing 
the trade regime to justify its activities and policies according to ethical criteria, it has 
helped to prompt reflexive questioning of both the means and ends of trade policy, and 
thereby to facilitate policy learning at the deepest level. 
 
Third, and perhaps most important, human rights networks can help to overcome 
cognitive obstacles to trade policy learning.177 Institutionalized processes of monitoring 
environmental feedback, and encouraging critical reflection, are not always sufficient to 
generate learning. The production of new knowledge can still be impeded by the 
cognitive frameworks which trade policy-makers use to make sense of the world, and to 
draw lessons from past experience. These epistemological frameworks can be deeply 
embedded and highly resistant to change: even when faced with unexpected and seriously 
adverse policy outcomes, it has been shown that decision-makers often tend to draw 
 
176 A contrary point of view has been put forward by the OHCHR: ‘Human rights, trade and investment’, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9, 2 July 2003, at paragraph 57. A subtler and perhaps more compelling variant of the 
same argument has been put forward by Frederick Abbott. In the context of a discussion of the relationship 
between human rights and competition law, he has argued that systems of competition law typically have at 
least three different basic objectives (consumer protection, protection of democracy, and protecting the 
integrity of the market), and that the emphasis given to each objectives changes across systems and over 
time. He suggests that ‘integrating human rights law’ with competition law may mean a greater emphasis 
on its consumer protection function. Whether or not we agree with the specifics of his analysis (and it has 
much to commend), his general point that human rights may work more indirectly by subtly reshaping 
constitutive ideas about the fundamental purposes of a regulatory system is a strong one, and one which 
may well have application in relation to trade law. See F. Abbott, 'The 'Rule of Reason' and the Right to 
Health: Integrating Human Rights and Competition Principles in the context of TRIPS' in T. Cottier, E. 
Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 279 at 289 and surrounding. 
177 See B. Hedberg, 'How Organizations Learn and Unlearn' in P.C. Nystrom and W.H. Starbuck (eds.), 
Handbook of organizational design (1981), xxii. 
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lessons which reinforce their pre-existing beliefs.178 Institutions and organizations which 
are designed and rationalized on the basis of particular ways of seeing the world also tend 
to perpetuate and entrench such worldviews, and can impede vital cognitive change. For 
example, many of the ‘strategic policy beliefs’ mentioned earlier – that liberalization is 
best conducted reciprocally and progressively, or that the distributive outcomes of 
international trade ought not to be the business of the trade regime – are deeply engrained 
in the architecture of the trade regime. They are sustained, disseminated and given a 
‘commonsense’ character through institutional practices and procedures; routines and 
habits; histories and narratives; and a variety of discursive and institutional processes at 
work within the trade regime. The institutional features of the trade regime, in other 
words, do not simply guide participants’ behaviour, but also teach them a particular way 
of understanding the trading system, and of how political power ought to be deployed 
within it. 
 
The human rights movement can help to overcome these obstacles, by providing an 
alternative environment for the generation and dissemination of knowledge about the 
trading system, which is not subject to the same cognitive constraints. To take a simple 
example, I said above that our knowledge of the impacts of international trade has 
traditionally tended to focus on a limited set of questions – such as the impact of trade on 
growth, on resource allocation, on industrial competitiveness, or on relative factor 
returns. Since this kind of knowledge is relatively well-understood, authoritative, 
developed and familiar, these factors tend to figure prominently in decisions about what 
kind of trade policy to pursue, and are prominent feature in the policy evaluations which 
occur in and around international trade negotiations. In human rights discourse, however, 
different preoccupations tend to be given prominence. For example, the human rights 
movement tends focus on the impact of trade policy on access to food, on the livelihoods 
of the rural poor, on women and other vulnerable groups, on health, and so on. As the 
High Commissioner has observed, “a human rights approach tends to examine trade law 
and policy [differently], focussing not only on economic growth, markets or economic 
development but also on health systems, education, water supply, food security, labour, 
 
178 R. Jervis, Perception and misperception in international politics (1976), Chapter 4 
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political processes, and so on.”179 Human rights, therefore, offers the possibility of 
influencing trade policy by reshaping the kinds of knowledge on which policy choices are 
based. 
 
How might this work in practice? The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) 
has suggested that human rights actors “undertake empirical studies and evaluations” of 
the impact of trade liberalization on factors and indicators of particular relevance to their 
work.180 This may mean that such actors generate original research and new data, based 
on the experience of “advocates working on the ground”. More commonly, however, it 
will involve collecting and collating available data, “collaborat[ing] with partners 
engaged in data analysis”, and exploring ways of integrating their work with other actors 
involved in knowledge production and dissemination.181 In this model, the human rights 
movement helps to re-shape the kind of knowledge which is produced about the trading 
system by engaging in collaborative work with traditional knowledge producers, asking 
new questions of these experts, providing a pre-existing network for the dissemination 
and circulation of new findings, as well as offering an institutional space in which new 
knowledge can be brought to the attention of policy-makers at the international level. For 
example, human rights actors have been at the forefront of collaborative efforts to 
produce new data on the impact of international trade policies on women and gender 
equality.182 This work has in turn helped to generate interest in the subject in more 
traditional venues of knowledge production, such as universities and think-tanks,183 and 
thereby to redefine the domain of relevant knowledge which is deployed in trade policy 
debates. In this way, human rights actors are arguably helping to generate practices 
through such knowledge is routinely taken into account in the kinds of strategic 
calculations which governments use to determine their trade policy interests.  
 
179 OHCHR, ‘Liberalization of trade in services and human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002, at 
para 7. 
180 International Federation for Human Rights, “Understanding Global Trade and Human Rights”, July 
2005, 14. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Among many examples, see the recent report by 3D, “Niger: Agricultural Trade Liberalization and 
Women’s Rights” (August 2006), available at www.3Dthree.org. 
183 An interesting recent example is Schultz, “Does the Liberalization of Trade Advance Gender Equity in 
Schooling and Health”, Yale University Economic Growth Center, Discussion Paper No. 935, May 2006, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=9055538. 
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The human rights movement has influenced not only what information tends to be 
produced about the trading system, but also how that information is interpreted. In order 
to transform raw information about the outcomes of the trading system into usable policy 
knowledge, such information needs to be embedded within narratives and thick causal 
descriptions, which give meaning to this information, and suggest ways of responding to 
it. These processes are inescapably social: they involve the production of collective 
meanings and policy narratives, and the generation of broadly shared cognitive 
frameworks. Human rights can help in this collective processing of information into new 
knowledge by providing an repertoire of discursive and cognitive resources – habits of 
thought, concepts, images and principles – different from those available in traditional 
trade policy discourse. These alternative discursive resources help to generate different 
interpretive frameworks through which information about the trading system is 
processed. Such interpretive frameworks are of course highly contingent – what is 
produced does not, in other words, amount to a ‘human rights perspective’ on the trade 
regime in any simple sense.  
 
While it is difficult to give examples without crude over-generalization, two illustrations 
might help to make the point clearer. First, much of the discussion in and around the trade 
regime is structured by an image of politics as a series of collective action dilemmas: in 
part as a result, the regime has defined its task as enabling the co-operative, mutual 
reduction of barriers to international trade. Human rights discourse, however, tends to see 
politics as a power struggle: the core problem posed by the international trading system, 
therefore, is to ensure that the benefits of the trading system accrue to the most vulnerable 
and marginalized groups. In this way, human rights discourse can help to generate new 
problem definitions for trade policy questions. Second, as mentioned earlier, traditional 
trade policy discourse tends to view resistance to liberal trade as the natural state of 
politics, protectionism as the outcome of pressure from ‘special interest’ groups, and 
consumers and exporters as the carriers of the ‘public interest’. By contrast, 
contemporary human rights discourse understands these political dynamics in different 
terms, tending to see those in favour of liberal trade as (predatory) special interest groups. 
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Various actors such as civil society groups, and certain kinds of producers, tend to be 
discursively constructed as carriers of the public interest. The result can be that trade and 
human rights discourse generate very different narratives to explain and give meaning to 
similar social phenomena. The point I am making is a general one: that human rights can 
help to provide a social space, and the cognitive resources, to aid in the restructuring of 
our knowledge about the trading system, and the reframing of trade policy questions. In 
doing so, it can help to overcome the cognitive rigidities which currently impede trade 
policy learning. 
 
Though it is rarely made explicit, in my view the human rights movement is therefore 
very much in the game of knowledge production. When human rights actors produce 
their numerous commentaries on the ‘human rights impact’ of the trading system, and so 
on, one of the most important functions they are performing is facilitating the production 
of social knowledge: generating shared narratives; synthesizing some kind of consensus 
about how certain aspects of the trading system operate; and selecting, reframing and 
imparting new meaning to information produced by various kinds of trade policy experts. 
The knowledge thereby produced can, of course, influence policy-makers directly, 
helping them to reformulate their strategies and explicit policy preferences. Just as 
important, however, is the destabilizing role it plays in respect of traditional trade 
debates. It facilitates the reconsideration and renewal of such debates by highlighting 
their inevitable cognitive limitations, and by demonstrating that traditional trade experts 
have no monopoly on the truths which can be told about the trading system. As Jacobsen 
has noted in a different context, it is precisely the “public clashes” among different 
communities, and among different regimes of truth, that can often yield “the most 
valuable and self-critical input into policy decisions”.184 It is in my view one of the most 
productive functions that the human rights movement has so far performed in trade policy 
debates, and one which, if made more explicit, may usefully guide their future 
interventions. 
 
184 J.K. Jacobsen, 'Much Ado about Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy', (1995) 47(2) World 
Politics 283, 303. 
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Recognizing and making explicit this conception of the function of human rights has 
implications for the kind of activities that human rights actors engage in, as well as for 
the kind of scholarship which is produced in the context of the trade and human rights 
debate. Instead of focussing attention on elaborating more detailed human rights norms, 
on spelling out their apparent implications for particular trade policy questions, and on 
constructing an entire international legal system to complement and counteract WTO law 
on the international level, human rights actors may prefer to focus on performing 
effectively as a knowledge network. Precisely what this looks like will naturally be 
worked out over time, but it may involve highlighting and paying closer attention to those 
questions to which trade policy experts traditionally do not address themselves, providing 
an impetus for the production of knowledge on those questions, as well as creating a 
space in which such knowledge will be heard. It may involve providing social and 
institutional mechanisms for the distribution and exchange of such information, helping 
to transform it from mere information into the kind of processed – and, crucially, shared 
– knowledge about the trading system which informs policy-making on an ongoing basis. 
It may also involve more explicit and directed mechanisms for bringing such knowledge 
to the attention of relevant policy-makers.  
 
5. Challenging technical rationality 
 
There is a fifth and final model about what human rights bring to trade policy debates 
which it is worth outlining briefly. I drew a distinction at the beginning of this Part 
between ‘primary’ trade policy ideas (beliefs about what kinds of trade policy are best), 
and ‘secondary’ trade policy ideas (beliefs about how to judge what kinds of trade policy 
are best). I suggested that, at the level of secondary ideas, trade policy-making is deeply 
structured by beliefs that trade policy is specialized technical field, and that the 
determination of the best trade policy is best left to trained experts. Arguably, however, 
contemporary controversies about the international trade regime are in part the result of a 
widespread loss of faith in technical expertise. We are less sure than we have ever been 
of the ability of experts to fully – or even adequately – understand the world, and are less 
convinced than we have ever been of the ‘rationality’ and desirability of their policy 
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prescriptions. The engagement of human rights into trade policy debates is arguably both 
an effect and a cause of this decline of faith in ‘expertise’ (and all that that word implies). 
It is an effect in the sense that it is part of a more general search for new actors and new 
languages to augment trade policy debates. It is a cause in the sense that human rights 
discourse provides us with a different set of ideas about ‘how to judge what kinds of trade 
policy are best’ – specifically, a set of ideas which prominently includes notions of 
procedural fairness, and distributive justice. Human rights, on this view, offer the 
possibility of transforming the governance of trade by prompting us to rethink the 
normative framework which tells us what represents an authoritative and legitimate 
intervention into questions of trade policy. 
 
To a significant degree, we are accustomed to judging trade policy by how closely it 
conforms to substantive policy prescriptions established in the relevant economic 
literature. But human rights actors have been prominent among those making the claim 
that we ought not to judge trade policy (and the trade regime) solely by its substantive 
rationality, but also by its procedural rationality.185 The UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, for example, sees an urgent need to increase the breadth and depth of 
public participation in trade policy-making processes, including in the WTO itself.186 
This may involve giving civil society actors “direct access to WTO meetings and 
decision-making processes”, potentially developing “mechanisms of redress” for 
individuals affected by decisions taken in the international trade regime, or being more 
willing to take the content of amicus curiae briefs into account in dispute settlement, as 
“a means of strengthening civil society’s participation in the multilateral trading 
system”.187 Moreover, the High Commissioner argues, international institutions such as 
the WTO must see it as part of their mission to encourage participation in policy-making 
 
185 See generally, J. Atik, 'Democratizing the WTO', (2001) 33 George Washington International Law 
Review 451; R. Howse, 'How to Begin to Think About the 'Democratic Deficit' at the WTO' in S. Griller 
(ed.) International Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns (2003), 79; K. Raustiala, 
'Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law', (2003) 6 Journal of International 
Economic Law 841; S. Charnovitz, 'The WTO and Cosmopolitics', (2004) 7(3) Journal of International 
Economic Law 675, OHCHR, ‘Analytical study of the HCHR on the fundamental principle of participation 
and its application in the context of globalization’, E/CN.4/2005/41, 23 December 2004. 
186 OHCHR, ‘Analytical study of the HCHR on the fundamental principle of participation and its 
application in the context of globalization’, E/CN.4/2005/41, 23 December 2004. 
187 Id., at paras 42-43. 
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at the national level.188 Recent calls for WTO dispute settlement panels to concentrate on 
procedural review of national trade policy measures reflect a similar turn.189 The High 
Commissioner has also emphasized the need for transparency in the WTO, “so that the 
outcomes of … negotiation processes are open to public scrutiny”.190 The point here is 
that human rights norms are being deployed to challenge our ideas about how trade 
policy proposals ought to be judged, and by whom. Within this human rights framework, 
what matters is not so much whether international trade policies are right or wrong, 
according to certain technical criteria, but rather who made them, and how. Human rights 
are, in other words, helping to reconstitute our ideas of what is a valuable and worthwhile 
contribution to trade policy-making processes, and who is in a position to provide such a 
contribution. 
 
Human rights discourse also focusses our attention on questions of distributive justice. 
Bureaucratic international organizations, particularly those like the WTO which rely 
heavily on technical expertise as an important source of their legitimacy, tend to structure 
their activity so that questions of distributive justice appear irrelevant to their tasks. This 
is because their continuing authority depends crucially on an appearance of apolitical 
neutrality.191 One implication has been that explicit evaluation of trade policy from the 
perspective of distributive justice concerns has been discouraged, and notions of fairness 
have therefore played a relatively minor role in shaping the activity and operation of the 
international trade regime.192 Human rights discourse can help to counteract this trend. 
 
188 Id., at para 22. 
189 See, for example, in the context of discussion of the SPS agreement: D.A. Wirth, 'The Role of Science 
in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines', (1994) 27(3) Cornell International Law Journal 
817, 855 and generally; O. Perez, Ecological sensitivity and global legal pluralism: rethinking the trade 
and environment debate (2003), 152; J. Scott, 'International Trade and Environmental Governance: 
Relating Rules (and Standards) in the EU and the WTO', (2004) 15(2) European Journal of International 
Law 307; D. Winickoff, et al., 'Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World 
Trade Law', (2005) 30 Yale Journal of International Law 81, 109 and generally. 
190 OHCHR, ‘Liberalization of trade in services and human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002, at 
para 12. 
191 M.N. Barnett and M. Finnemore, 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', 
(1999) 53(4) International Organization 699. 
192 I should not be misunderstood as suggesting that questions of fairness and justice are entirely new to the 
trade regime, nor that the can fully supplant norms of technical rationality. A variety of normative 
frameworks are almost always in play in all fields of policy, co-existing and often interacting in complex 
ways. This is just as true of international trade as any other area. For example, although a variety of 
different explanations exist for the centrality of the MFN principle in the GATT/WTO system, the best is 
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Human rights have over the last decade or so provided a language and an institutional 
space in which concerns about justice and about the fairness of the international trading 
order have been articulated, and brought to the forefront of our attention. Human rights 
actors have drawn attention in particular to what they call the unfair treatment of 
developing countries in the trade regime: the stricter level of obligations imposed in 
practice on developing countries; the disproportionately small share of the benefits of 
international trade that they receive; and the difficulties they face in implementing their 
obligations (and in convincing developed countries to fulfil theirs). Human rights actors 
have also been instrumental in developing and disseminating knowledge about the 
distributive impact of international trade within countries. In the present context, the 
importance of this work is that it has helped to generate a consensus that we ought to 
judge the international trading order primarily by its fairness (not solely its rationality), 
and that desirable trade policy is above all just trade policy. And this consensus in turn 
has contributed to a change in trade policy debates, so that we have begun once more to 
discuss and debate what ‘fairness’ means in international economic relations193, what 
different forms fairness may take, how a more equitable international economic order 
might realistically be achieved. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
This paper began with a conviction that the time had come for a critical appraisal of the 
foundation, shape and direction of the present trade and human rights literature. It will be 
clear by now that the purpose of this exercise is intended to be constructive. While there 
is no doubt that engagement between trade and human rights scholars is to be desired, 
 
that it is the expression of shared beliefs about what constitutes a ‘fair’ global trading system: Narlikar, 
“Fairness in International Trade Negotiations: Developing Countries in the GATT and WTO” 
(forthcoming, World Economy, Summer 2006). Similarly, analyses of the processes by which Part IV of the 
GATT 1947 – as well as the variety of SDT provisions of that agreement pre-1994 – suggest that these 
provisions are best understood as the result of a temporary consensus that developing countries ought in 
fairness to be give special treatment: R.E. Hudec, Developing countries in the GATT legal system (1987). 
193 See generally, F.J. Garcia, 'Trade and Justice: Linking the Trade Linkage Debates', (1998) 19(2) 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 391; F.J. Garcia, 'Trade and Inequality: 
Economic Justice and the Developing World', (2000) 21(4) Michigan Journal of International Law 975. 
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and similarly no doubt that the trade and human rights literature has to date produced 
some important and highly productive work, there are in my view still some significant 
gaps and flaws in the assumptions and modes of argumentation characteristic of the 
contemporary debate. The critiques I make are intended to help put that literature on a 
surer conceptual footing going forward, so as to facilitate a more sustained, direct and 
productive engagement between trade and human rights institutions, languages, scholars 
and communities. 
 
Although my argument is divided into two distinct halves, both fundamentally stem from 
my interest in the way that international law and international regimes shape the way we 
think. The first half of my argument, then, is that insufficient attention is paid to the ways 
in which the trade regime shapes the way trade policy-makers think (and therefore act). 
We almost exclusively think of the trade regime in one-dimensional terms as a set of 
formally binding rules constraining the behaviour of its Members. In the trade and human 
rights literature, this translates into a preoccupation with the ways in which trade law 
constrains the ability of governments to pursue human rights policies and fulfil their 
human rights obligations. Criticism and proposals for change therefore focus on ‘getting 
the rules right’, and in particular on removing excessive constraints and opening up 
sufficient ‘policy space’ for WTO Members. But the trade regime is much more than a 
set of binding rules. It is a social environment in which ideas about the best and most 
appropriate trade policies are generated, legitimated and disseminated. It is a cognitive 
environment in which states are taught states how to interpret the international economic 
order, and how to calculate their interests in it. And it is also an institutional environment 
which re-shapes the mix of actors involved in trade policy-making, and the avenues of 
influence available to them. The reason that recognizing these different functions of the 
trade regime is important only partly because they too ‘affect human rights’, and the 
critical eye of human rights scholars should therefore be trained on them. It is also 
important because they represent some of the most significant mechanisms by which the 
trade regime might be engaged in re-building a different and better international 
economic order. They represent the means by which the trade regime can help us to 
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rethink our ideas about what constitutes a desirable international trading order, and help 
us to imagine a new future for it.  
 
The second half of my argument is that insufficient attention is paid to the ways in which 
the human rights movement can help to re-shape the way trade policy-makers think (and 
therefore act). When human rights actors attempt to engage in debates about what trade 
policy ought to be, they run up against very powerful beliefs that they do not have the 
expertise to speak authoritatively on these matters – at least not in their capacity as 
human rights experts. Sometimes, the result is that human rights actors act primarily as 
passive recipients of trade policy knowledge, so that the ‘trade agenda’ of the human 
rights movement becomes essentially a re-articulation of proposals and arguments 
already in circulation. At other times, the debate is re-cast as a confrontation between two 
different types of expertise, responding to two different kinds of social demands – trade 
liberalization and the protection of human rights. I have suggested that, for all the 
avenues they open, these two responses ultimately lead the debate away from the most 
important issues. However, I also suggested that human rights actors are involved in 
generating ‘new thinking’ about desirable trade policy, even if not in any simple or direct 
way. The human rights movement has helped to facilitate policy learning by helping to 
create an environment in which such new thinking is made more likely. And it has helped 
to re-shape prevailing knowledge about desirable and rational trade policy by modifying 
the conditions in which such knowledge is produced. I suggested that there is 
nevertheless scope for human rights actors to re-focus and target their interventions so as 
to perform these functions more effectively. 
